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US Ambassador Robert Wood at the UN, 20 May 2024:
“We also will continue to put a bright spotlight on Russia’s troubling actions in space, and how they diverge from its statements here in the Security Council.

Indeed, just last week, on May 16, Russia launched a satellite into low Earth orbit that the United States assesses is likely a counterspace weapon presumably capable of attacking other satellites in low Earth orbit. Russia deployed this new counterspace weapon into the same orbit as a U.S. government satellite.

Russia’s May 16 launch follows prior Russian satellite launches likely of counterspace systems to low Earth orbit in 2019 and 2022.” https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-before-the-vote-on-a-russia-drafted-un-security-council-resolution-on-outer-space-security/

“Counterspace Weapons 101” PUBLISHED October 28, 2019 LAST UPDATED June 14, 2022, Quotes: “There are four distinct categories of counterspace weapons: kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber…. Any of these types of weapons could be used against a satellite or the ground stations that support it, making it an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.” https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101/

“Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds a Press Briefing
May 21, 2024 Major General Pat Ryder, Pentagon Press Secretary
Excerpt:
“Q: The other topic – at the United Nations – U.S. representative of the United Nations talked about how last week, Russia launched an anti-satellite weapon, potentially the same altitude as an American satellite. Is this a concern? Can you confirm that information that was presented at the United Nations? And what is – what is the message, if you have a comment?

GEN. RYDER: Yeah, so it – it – and what I’m tracking here is on May 16th, as you highlight, Russia launched a satellite into low Earth orbit that we – that we assess is likely a counter-space weapon presumably capable of attacking other satellites in low Earth orbit.

Russia deployed this new counter-space weapon into the same orbit as a U.S. government satellite. And so assessments further indicate characteristics resembling previously deployed counter-space payloads from 2019 and 2022. And so, you know, obviously that’s something that we’ll continue to monitor.

Certainly, we would say that we have a responsibility to be ready to protect and defend the domain – the space domain and ensure continuous and uninterrupted support to the Joint and Combined Force. And we’ll continue to balance the need to protect our interests in space with our desire to preserve a stable and sustainable space environment.

Q: Does it pose a threat to that government satellite – the U.S. government satellite right now?

GEN. RYDER: Well, it’s a counter-space weapon in the same orbit as a U.S. government satellite, so.”
(…)
“Q: It’s a follow-up on Loui’s question from earlier. Did Russia communicate with the U.S. at all that it was going to launch the anti-satellite weapon? And has there been any communication since?

GEN. RYDER: I’m not aware of any communication, but I’ll have to take that question. As you know, there’s a process by which there are launches are conducted, so I’ll have to take that question. (…)” https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3783786/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

“Remarks Before the Vote on a Russia-Drafted UN Security Council Resolution on Outer Space Security Home | | Remarks Before the Vote on a Russia-Drafted UN Security Council Resolution on Outer Space Security
Ambassador Robert Wood
 Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs

New York, New York 
May 20, 2024
AS DELIVERED

Thank you, Mr. President.

Colleagues, we are here today because Russia seeks to distract global attention from its development of a new satellite carrying a nuclear device.

On April 24, Russia vetoed a resolution, supported by 13 members of the Security Council that called on all Member States not to develop nuclear weapons specifically designed to be placed in orbit.

That resolution, which was a product of nearly two months of constructive negotiations and co-sponsored by 65 countries, reflected a simple reality: placement of a nuclear weapon into orbit would not only violate the Outer Space Treaty, it would also threaten human spaceflight as well as the vital communications, scientific, meteorological, agricultural, commercial, and national security services that any and all satellites provide to people around the globe.

We have heard President Putin say publicly that Russia has no intention of deploying nuclear weapons in space. If that were the case, Russia would not have vetoed that resolution.

Over the past several weeks, and following widespread condemnation from a geographically diverse group of Member States in the General Assembly on May 6, Russia has sought to distract from its dangerous efforts to put a nuclear weapon into orbit. The culmination of Russia’s campaign of diplomatic gaslighting and dissembling is the text before us today.

Drafted through a hasty process that did not take into account legitimate, repeated, and shared concerns by a majority of this Council, Russia’s resolution does not achieve the simple task that we set out to achieve several months ago: reaffirm the basic obligations of the Outer Space Treaty and avoid a nuclear arms race in space.

Consequently, the United States will not support this disingenuous resolution. We urge the Council to reject it and instead reiterate our call for Russia to join every other member of this Council in supporting the common sense, straightforward text that dozens of Member States supported only four weeks ago.

Again, Russia does not want the Security Council to focus on its dangerous actions in space. Its veto then requires that we be skeptical of its statements today and its intentions in putting forward this resolution.

It’s also vital we not lose track of some simple facts.

First, rather than enhance arms control, the Russian text put forward today would narrow the scope of efforts in other United Nations bodies in a way that would be detrimental to preventing an arms race in outer space.

Second, by seeking to use this resolution to put forward language on other topics that Russia knows does not have consensus support in this Council, Russia’s text also distracts from affirming the important obligations of all 116 States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty – including that no nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction be put into orbit.

Third, the text that Russia vetoed on April 24 went to great lengths to address every Council member’s concerns in a broader and more inclusive manner than what Russia has forced on the Council today.

To repeat: the resolution that Russia vetoed was supported by 13 members of this Council and was co-sponsored by 65 Member States.

It reflected the strong global consensus, as the President of the General Assembly

Ambassador Francis later declared, during the Assembly’s May 6 meeting that: “[o]uter space does not belong to individual nations. Its peaceful and sustainable use is not subject to national appropriation and must be a place of peace and cooperation for the benefit and in the interest of all countries.” The United States could not agree more.

For our part, the United States will continue to demonstrate how space activities can be conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner in order to preserve the benefits of space for current and future generations.

We also will continue to put a bright spotlight on Russia’s troubling actions in space, and how they diverge from its statements here in the Security Council.

Indeed, just last week, on May 16, Russia launched a satellite into low Earth orbit that the United States assesses is likely a counterspace weapon presumably capable of attacking other satellites in low Earth orbit. Russia deployed this new counterspace weapon into the same orbit as a U.S. government satellite.

Russia’s May 16 launch follows prior Russian satellite launches likely of counterspace systems to low Earth orbit in 2019 and 2022.

Colleagues, I urge you to vote “no” on this distraction and to join us in pressing Russia to cease its obstruction here in the Security Council.

And we urge you to join us in making clear to Russia that the world will not turn a blind eye to its dangerous and unprecedented efforts to develop a new satellite carrying a nuclear device, which undermines its obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and counters the views of an overwhelming majority of members of the Security Council.
Thank you, Mr. President.
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Thank you, Mr. President. I apologize for taking the floor, but I obviously need to respond to the remarks made by the Russian representative. In answer to his question: Yes, I read your bad text. Your text includes a lengthy binding mechanism that cannot be verified. That is clear. We have had those discussions in Geneva before with regard to the type of treaty that you would like to see come into place. So, we’ve seen this movie before. But what I would submit to my Russian colleague is that we let the Council decide on his text. And we’re about to do that. Thank you.
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By United States Mission to the United Nations | 20 May, 2024 | Topics: Highlights, Remarks and Highlights” https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-before-the-vote-on-a-russia-drafted-un-security-council-resolution-on-outer-space-security/
The web site is down and has been down for some time, but it can be seen both above and within google cache: https://archive.is/https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-before-the-vote-on-a-russia-drafted-un-security-council-resolution-on-outer-space-security/