Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Russia VECTOR Bio Lab Researched Vaccine for the Original SARS-COVID; VECTOR Lab Exploded in September 2019.

Let’s see, who was Russian President in December of 2004? That would be Putin. Who was Russian President in 2019? Putin: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin

This means that not only does the VECTOR lab have smallpox, it also has the original SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV). There’s also an airport in that town. Part of the lab exploded in September of 2019. SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19) was found in China in October or November. Russia claimed that the part of the lab, that exploded, was under renovation, and you believe them? LOL. Putin-Russia media mocked the UK for putting out a map which showed his invasion plan, and then they invaded.

“On 30 April 1988, a doctor died two weeks after accidentally pricking himself through two layers of rubber gloves with a needle contaminated with the Marburg virus. In 2004, a researcher at VECTOR died after accidentally pricking herself with a needle contaminated with the Ebola virus. On 17 September 2019, a gas explosion occurred at Vector. One worker suffered third-degree burns, and the blast blew out window panes. The lab has highly contagious forms of bird flu and strains of hepatitis. The explosion happened in a decontamination room that was being renovated by a contractor.” Supposedly being renovated! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Research_Center_of_Virology_and_Biotechnology_VECTOR

Russia Vector Lab has Smallpox, Ebola, Anthrax, etc.; 2019 Lab Explosion-Accident

The US actually gave Russian Bio-labs approximately $1 billion dollars. Much was given when Putin was President or PM, though the US appears to have NOT funded this project. https://web.archive.org/web/20220210102515/https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK201545/ The reason that Putin-Kremlin propagandists know about this lab money is that they took so much of it themselves. See how they twist things? The Kremlin propagandists have been messing with people minds for over 100 years now. Wake up people. They’ve been studying you for over 100 years and, hence, often know you better than you know yourselves.

The dumbest ever Kremlin-Russia propaganda is that Russia’s blowing up Ukrainian bio-labs and that’s supposed to save people, when, in fact, that would spread all sorts of pathogens. If they are doing it, it’s a major war crime. What the US gave Ukraine was a pittance compare to what was given to Russia and most of it was under the pro-Russian President Yanukoviych. Will Russia blow up its own US funded bio-labs? Oh, whoops they did it.

No one has asked if Covid 19 came from Russia’s 2019 lab explosion, either. So, did it? Questions have been raised about the Fort Detrick shutdown in the US, but no mention of the lab science director, Sina Bavari, being an Iranian. The Fort Detrick Lab was shut end of July or beginning of August 2019, because of safety concerns. Sina Bavari appears to have come to the US as a student shortly before the Iranian Revolution, which means that he could have any ideology. This is an article about him: “Army report says science director creating ‘environment of fear’ at USAMRIID” By Sylvia Carignan, Aug 13, 2016 https://web.archive.org/web/20210819223258/https://www.fredericknewspost.com/news/health/treatment_and_diseases/army-report-says-science-director-creating-environment-of-fear-at-usamriid/article_7360c975-682b-52e4-9e31-9e67fc36e47a.html

From 2004. It would be interesting to know who the University of Michigan collaborators were, and what their nationality was:
“Nanovaccines
#2164.3
Inactivated Vaccines Based on Nanoemulsions
Tech Area / Field
* MED-VAC/Vaccines/Medicine
* BIO-CGM/Cytology, Genetics and Molecular Biology/Biotechnology
Status
3 Approved without Funding
Registration date 
14.12.2004
Leading Institute
 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR, Russia, Novosibirsk reg., Koltsovo
Collaborators
* University of Michigan / Center for Biologic Nanotechnology, USA, MI, Ann Arbor

Project summary
Project Goals: Creation of an efficient inactivated vaccine against SARS. Investigation of possibility to develop non-reactogenic efficient inactivated vaccine for prophylaxis of smallpox.

Project Narrative and Main Idea:

Data that we have obtained during work on a whole-virion vaccine against some virus infectious diseases show that during inactivation of the virus with formaldehyde or heat the conformational structure of the virus’s proteins changes, which results in no neutralizing antibody response. In spite of progress achieved in modern biotechnology and numerous examples of vaccine development based on recombinant and other technologies, killed vaccines continue to be an important tool in combating infections. For some infections, such as hepatitis A or tick-borne encephalitis, the use of a whole-virion inactivated virus, purified to a lesser/ higher degree, is and will (in the very immediate future) remain the only and quite efficient preventive tool. One of the most vulnerable things about this technology is to find a way to ensure guaranteed inactivation of the pathogen grown. In most cases, formalin is used that is, unfortunately, reactogenic. Another disadvantage in using inactivated vaccines is the almost absolute lack of adjuvants allowed for use in humans.

This study proposes to make use of inactivating and adjuvant properties of nanoemulsions to make inactivated vaccines. Nanoemulsions (www.nano.med.umich.edu) represent finely dispersed fractions of edible oil with minimal added quantities of surfactants, which is produced by mixing oil with water under high pressure conditions. As a result, a lipid-containing emulsion can be produced, with the size of oil droplets from 20 nm to 800 nm, that are capable of destroying the membrane of eukaryotic cells or viruses, without affecting the eukaryotic cells themselves.

The inactivating efficacy of nanoemulsions was demonstrated against a wide range of viral and bacterial agents, including DNA-and RNA viruses, spore-and vegetative forms of bacteria (Chepurnov A et al., 2003, Hamouda T et al., 1999, Hamouda T et all, 2001). Nanoemulsions were also demonstrated to possess adjuvant properties (Myc A., et al., 2003). The sparing effect of the nanoemulsions on eukaryotic cells, their proven efficacy in pathogen inactivation, and use of natural ingredients for producing nanoemulsions allowed us to propose this project to make inactivated whole-virion vaccines against SARS and vaccinia virus/ectromelia, as a model for smallpox.

Despite the high effectiveness of the use of vaccinia virus for vaccination against smallpox, this vaccine has significant defect – high reactogenity. Especially this becomes actual last decades when the number of persons with immunodeficiency status increases. We think this problem is also possible to solve by the using of inactivated with nanoemulsion vaccinia virus. This will decrease the reactogenicity of a vaccine meanwhile the decrease of protectivity will compensate by adjuvant properties of nanoemulsion. The investigation is planned to perform on the model of mouse pox virus (ectromielia), which is high virulent for mice. After immunization of mice with inactivated by nanoemulsion vaccinia virus the protectivety will be studied by ectromielia virus challenge.

Expected results:

Preparations for vaccination against SARS-cv would be obtained and the model of creation of non-reactogenic vaccine against smallpox would be developed. The problem of creation of a vaccine against SARS and modernization of a vaccine against smallpox is extremely actual at the present time in connection with a possibility of terror use of preparations on the base of this viral agent.

Project Location and Equipment:

All experimentation activities would be carried out at the facilities of the BSL-4 viruses Laboratory of the Institute of Molecular Biology at SRC VB VECTOR, Koltsovo, Novosibirsk region. The said laboratory has BSL-3 containment to accommodate work on infected cell cultures and animals, carry out immunochemistry and other studies.
https://web.archive.org/web/20190423103248/http://www.istc.int/en/project/17B2EAFF3F79D73FC3256F7200434133

“The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) is an intergovernmental organization established in 1992 by an agreement between the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States. It was signed in Moscow in 1992 and provisionally entered into force on 2 March 1994, pending ratification by the Duma.
The ISTC serves as a clearinghouse for developing, approving, financing, and monitoring projects aimed at engaging weapons scientists, technicians, and engineers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in peaceful, civilian science and technology activities. Non-weapons scientists can be included. Through its projects, the ISTC contributes to ongoing efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Its larger goals include reinforcing the CIS transition to a market-based economy responsive to civilian needs, and supporting basic and applied research and technology development. The operating bodies of the ISTC are the governing board, Coordination Committee, Science Advisory Committee, and secretariat (the executive body located in Moscow). ISTC branch offices have been set up in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with a coordination office in Tbilisi…”https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/international-science-and-technology-center-istc/

As of 2015 Russia left, as also discussed, below. And, the headquarters moved to Kazakhstan https://www.istc.int/en/about

“The New Agreement for the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
Simon Limage
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs , Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Washington, DC
June 30, 2015

“Now the foremost institution that deals with this particular mission is the ISTC, and last week I was pleased to be in Astana in Kazakhstan to initial the new agreement of the – continuing the ISTC, which has now moved its headquarters from Moscow to Astana.  And it is going to continue its very important work from Astana with a number of key partners.
This particular agreement that we initialed, which still needs to be signed – we hope to sign it in December – is the result of over three years of intensive work by the ISTC parties, including the Government of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and a number of other countries that are members. Since its creation in 1994, the ISTC has supported some 700 projects worth almost $1 billion in the former Soviet Union.  Projects have focused on biological, chemical, and nuclear nonproliferation, and been both bilateral and regional in nature. 
Changes in the ISTC membership have required the organization to find a new home to continue the center’s work.  In keeping with its commitment to nonproliferation and global security, the Government of Kazakhstan answered the call for a new host state.  We are fortunate the ISTC will have a home in a nation that has been very committed to the center and advancing our shared nonproliferation agenda.
The work of the ISTC is as important as it was when it was founded 20 years ago.  Weapons of mass destruction remain a real threat to our shared security.  Advances in science, as you can imagine, and increasing interest form terrorists make this an issue that transcends the state-to-state model that once prevailed.  Fortunately, the ISTC’s multilateral nature and flexibility make it an instrumental tool in mitigating those emerging threats. 
The continuing agreement, which will facilitate the future work of the ISTC, based at Nazarbayev University in Astana.  Thanks are also due to the staff of the ISTC that have worked to transform the ISTC into a new center for nonproliferation science and technology.  I look forward, as I have in the past, to working with the current members of the ISTC to sign the agreement, but also to expanding the organization to new countries beyond its current membership. 
Moving from the ISTC, I wanted to say a few words that’ll be of interest to you and to the countries that you’re from, with which we partner very closely.  Another program that the State Department sponsors globally is our counter nuclear smuggling activity.  The nonproliferation bureau that I work for is involved in strengthening international capabilities to counter the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials.  Real cases of nuclear smuggling indicate that additional materials may be still available in illegal circulation.  For example, specifically cases of weapon-usable nuclear material seized in Moldova in 2011, in Georgia in 2010, underscore the need for strengthened international cooperation to detect nuclear smuggling networks and secure trafficked materials…

I was also in Ukraine last week, where I led discussions with the Ukrainian Government to review our cooperation on this same issue of counter nuclear smuggling based on an agreement that we have with the Ukrainian Government that dates back to 2006.  Over the years, Ukraine has strengthened its ability to also detect and respond to nuclear smuggling at dozens of border crossings and other ports of entry – partly with U.S. support, partly using its own resources…

QUESTION:  Right.  (Laughter.)  Wasn’t it – in the first point, wasn’t it because of the Russian withdrawal that you have to come up with a new agreement?  Why – what’s the Russians’ claim?  Why do they claim that they are dropping out of this agreement?  And what’s the impact and what are the concerns?
MR LIMAGE:  It’s an excellent question and a very common question.  I’d start by saying that the ISTC has had a very strong partnership with Russian scientists and, more broadly, scientists throughout the former Soviet Union since the mid-90s when there was a strong sense of collaboration on addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of this dual-use expertise. 
The United States, and I dare say the other members of the governing board of the ISTC, had hoped and continue to hope that Russia would remain a part of the ISTC and contribute to working on problems of an international nature.  The ISTC, as I mentioned, is an international organization with a number of countries that fund projects aimed at developing strong science and encouraging good partnerships with a number of institutes throughout the region.  I, and I think my colleagues in the ISTC, were disappointed to get the news that the Russian Government had decided to leave the ISTC. 
I believe there is a difference of opinion that is clear between Russian scientists and some of the technical experts that we work with in Russia and the Russian Government itself.  And I believe, from some of the informal conversations that I have had and others of my international colleagues have had, is that if they’d had a choice, a number of those Russian institutes, institutions, and scientists would have preferred to stay involved as members of the ISTC.  Unfortunately – we respect the decision of the Russian Government to leave.  I would refer you to the Russian ministry of foreign affairs for any comments that they may have on the Russian decision.  But as of the middle of July, Russia will effectively have left the ISTC. 
As the United States representative to the ISTC governing board, I have said and will continue to say that Russia is welcome to rejoin at some time in the future.  The ISTC is not a political organization.  It’s a technical organization aimed at improving national security.  And the ISTC and Russian scientists have benefitted from that partnership and we can only express our disappointment that Russia has left at this point.
QUESTION:  What’s the impact?  Why are you disappointed?
MR LIMAGE:  Because, as I mentioned, there are a lot of Russian scientists that were pursuing important work with the ISTC – I think both to their benefit because they were part of a broader network that exposed them to science, scientific practices, and expertise from the other members of the ISTC.  My fear is that the Russian Government’s departure from the ISTC further isolates what is a very significant and important community of experts who have a lot to offer to their neighbors and to some of the other members of the ISTC like Japan, like Korea, like the United States, like Tajikistan, like the European Union, that are all members.  So Russia obviously has significant expertise, and for it to leave the organization is disappointing.
Now, it isn’t changing the course of the ISTC.  The ISTC has effectively now moved to Kazakhstan; its headquarters have moved.  We are looking to acquire new partners and to engage new countries and look forward to them joining the ISTC.  And as I said, at a future date we would welcome Russia rejoining the ISTC if it decided to do so…

QUESTION:  Yeah.  This is Boya Li with People’s Daily.  My question is you mentioned about Ukraine.  So has the crisis in Ukraine put the U.S.-Russia nuclear nonproliferation cooperation at stake?
MR LIMAGE:  So it’s an interesting question.  The dynamic between Russia and Ukraine has not necessarily had an enormous effect on our nonproliferation cooperation with Russia because that cooperation had been being reduced over the last several years.  The Government of Russia has signaled that it wanted – that it saw less areas for cooperation with the United States on nonproliferation for the last two years. 
In our heyday in the ’90s and early 2000, there was much more work that the United States funded in cooperation with the Russian – with Russian institutes and experts on what we call nonproliferation and threat reduction than today.  In fact, there’s very little that is left.  There are some legacy activities that the National Nuclear Security Administration here in the United States does with the Russian Government and there’s some limited work that the Department of Defense does with Russia.  But that is on a scale that is far smaller.
So Ukraine, I think, may have been a factor in some of the decisions more recently on the U.S. side but I think has had a limited impact in what was already a very much reduced relationship with Russia.  Now that doesn’t mean that we don’t believe that there are current threats that are important to address in nonproliferation, but the fact of the matter is that less work is being done in this area with Russia, between Russia and the United States.
QUESTION:  Mikyung Kim with Seoul Shinmun Daily, Korea.  Would you be more specific on how the ISTC has to do with the nonproliferation currently without Russia?  I mean, you have cooperated with Russia to stop proliferation for a long time, and without Russia is it effective, I mean, for – I mean, thinking about the whole of the ISTC?
And my second question is after Russia left, the organization requires the new or more roles to the remaining members like Korea?  And is – we just play as a funder, or we can have some benefit from this organization?  Thank you.
MR LIMAGE:  Absolutely.  Thank you for the question.  You ask a very good question:  What is the impact of Russia leaving the ISTC?  In our view, the impact is – the most significant impact of Russia’s departure is on Russian scientists and their technical experts.  The ISTC is on a course, we believe, to expand to new countries and continues to fund important work with the current members of the ISTC and, as I described very briefly, has worked with thousands of scientists and institutes in non-Russian countries of the former Soviet Union and continues to do so today and will do so in the future.  The ISTC has very strong relations with a number of institutes in Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and those have been good partnerships for institutes in other members of the ISTC – the Republic of Korea, Japan, the United States.  For the United States for example, our national labs are very heavily involved whether it’s Los Alamos or some of our other Department of Energy labs.  So I think the impact was really more on Russia than it has been on the ISTC.
In terms of the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea has been a longstanding member of the International Science and Technology Center.  It is a funder of the ISTC.  The Republic of Korea has enabled scientists from the former Soviet Union to participate in scientific cooperation and nonproliferation activities.  Some of the projects that have been funded include important topics in energy, in agriculture, in medicine, in material science, in aerospace, in physics, and include both academic and government research institutions. 
I’ll give you a specific example of what Korea has done.  Every year, for example, Korea sponsors workshops at Korean institutes and invites 10 to 15 Georgian scientists and scientists from the central – from the CIS countries to present their work on a wide range of topics.  Last year the topic was novel forms or new forms of sustainable energy production, and this year it will be nanotechnology.  This helps to develop future collaboration between CIS Georgian laboratories and their Korean counterparts. 
And I’ll – if you’d like some numbers in terms of funding, up till 2013 and through 2013, so including 2013, the ISTC reports that the Republic of Korea Government has provided $1,980,000 for projects, and private Korean partners have provided $339,189.  So the Republic of Korea is a very valued member of the ISTC and I think has demonstrated over the years its commitment to the organization and to its mission.” Read the entire thing here: https://2009-2017-fpc.state.gov/244628.htm