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“Republic of Korea and U.S. Soldiers at the demilitarized zone in South Korea facing North Korea on Nov. 11, 2012. DOD photo by D. Myles Cullen”

“How a man died on the way to Maeson Dong. September 2, 1950. Sgt. Turnbull. (Army) NARA FILE #: 111-SC-347826, WAR & CONFLICT BOOK #: 1511. Cleared for public release. This image is generally considered in the public domain – Not for commercial use. U.S. Army Korea – Installation Management Command”

Failing to keep watch and belatedly responding to aggression costs lives and money. The US had withdrawn from South Korea in the late 1940s, and the cost of not keeping watch was high. North Korea, created and backed by the USSR (i.e. Kremlin), attacked South Korea and almost conquered the entire peninsula. Pushing the North Korea (USSR) back to the starting line (38th parallel) had a high cost. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Demarcation_Line

This is US costs. It doesn’t include the long term VA costs; costs to the injured, etc, either. As some members of the US Congress explain, the cost of not helping Ukraine now could be much higher later. The US government has mostly failed to explain deterrence and national defense to the general public.

U.S. Military Casualties, Missing in Action, and Prisoners of War from the Era of the Korean War https://www.archives.gov/research/military/korean-war/electronic-records https://www.archives.gov/research/military/korean-war/casualty-lists/state-level-alpha.html

Korean War June 25 1950- July 27 1953
Current Year $ 30 billion
Constant FY2011$ 341 billion
$454 billion (2022$ est.)
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS22926.html
https://www.army.mil/koreanwar/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Armistice_Agreement
“All estimates are of the costs of military operations only and do not reflect costs of veterans’ benefits, interest on war-related debt, or assistance to allies…. all estimates are based on U.S. government budget data…. For the Korean War, the estimate represents increased expenditures of the DOD during the period of the conflict compared to the projected trend from the average of three years before the war to three years after.” See: “Costs of Major U.S. Wars” by Stephen Daggett Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets, June 29, 2010 https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS22926.html
CRS June 2010 publication, listed as fiscal year 2011. $1 June 2010 has the estimated value of $1.33 in April 2022: https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm

“The Wall of Remembrance is a new, permanent addition to the memorial which will include the names of 36,574 American servicemen and more than 7,200 members of the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army who gave their lives defending the people of South Korea”. https://www.nps.gov/kowa/wallofremembrance.htm

“the United States did not make Korea a key part of its defensive strategy for East Asia, and American forces withdrew from the south in the late 1940s… Kim’s army attacked the South in June 1950 almost conquering the entire peninsula. The U.S. military returned, leading a United Nations-authorized force to push the North’s army back above the 38th parallel and beyond…. Only in 1953 did the two sides reach an uneasy truce, thus crystallizing the division between North and South that exists today…”https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/korean-war

Apparently taking up the mantle of his friend, the late US Senator John McCain, US Senator Graham stated on May 19, 2022: “This is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to defeat Putin’s Russia, and the ripple effect would be enormous for U.S. national security interests. When it comes to Putin, either we pay now or we pay later”. https://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/5/why-i-support-a-ukraine-aid-package-before-it-s-too-late Putin’s Russia, Soviet Russia, Tsarist Russia — all the same aggressive imperialist thing.

“During World War II the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily divide Korea at the 38th parallel in order to oversee the removal of Japanese forces. It soon became clear, however, that neither of the cold war antagonists would permit its Korea ally to be threatened by unification. The Soviets supported Kim Il Song in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north; the United States backed Syngman Rhee in the Republic of Korea in the south. Nevertheless the United States did not make Korea a key part of its defensive strategy for East Asia, and American forces withdrew from the south in the late 1940s. Assuming that the United States did not consider South Korea of vital interest, Kim’s army attacked the South in June 1950 almost conquering the entire peninsula. The U.S. military returned, leading a United Nations-authorized force to push the North’s army back above the 38th parallel and beyond. After the People’s Republic of China entered the war in late 1950, the Department of State worked to isolate Peking and maintain the unity of the U.S.-led coalition. Only in 1953 did the two sides reach an uneasy truce, thus crystallizing the division between North and South that exists today. In 1953 the United States and South Korea signed a mutual security treaty designed to protect this new nation from its neighbor to the north.

U.S. efforts to save South Korea from Communist invasion accelerated Department of State attempts to restore Japan to a respected international position, and make that country a prosperous ally of the United States. Negotiated primarily by John Foster Dulles in 1950 and 1951, the Treaty of San Francisco ended the state of war between Japan and 47 of the Allies (most nations allied with the Soviet Union refused to sign), concluded the American Occupation, and excused the Japanese from reparations for the war. Acheson signed the San Francisco Treaty on September 8, 1951, the same day he and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signed the United States-Japanese Security Treaty. The treaty allowed the United States to station troops in Japan, and made the Japanese islands into an important facet of America’s global containment structure. To American leaders, Japan has transformed from World War II enemy to vital ally, and Korea went from a peripheral region to a key battle ground in the Cold War.” https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/korean-war

“Korean War
Online Documents Korean War
After five years of simmering tensions on the Korean peninsula, the Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when the Northern Korean People’s Army invaded South Korea in a coordinated general attack at several strategic points along the 38th parallel, the line dividing communist North Korea from the non-communist Republic of Korea in the south. North Korea aimed to militarily conquer South Korea and therefore unify Korea under the communist North Korean regime. Concerned that the Soviet Union and Communist China might have encouraged this invasion, President Harry S. Truman committed United States air, ground, and naval forces to the combined United Nations forces assisting the Republic of Korea in its defense. President Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as Commanding General of the United Nations Command (UNC).

The first several months of the war were characterized by armies advancing and retreating up and down the Korean peninsula. The initial North Korean attack drove United Nations Command forces to a narrow perimeter around the port of Pusan in the southern tip of the peninsula. After the front stabilized at the Pusan perimeter, General MacArthur surprised the North Koreans in September 1950 with an amphibious landing at Inchon behind North Korean lines, forcing the North Koreans to retreat behind the 38th parallel.

In October, the United Nations, urged by the United States Government, approved the movement of UN forces across the 38th parallel into North Korea in an effort to unify the country under a non-communist government. In spite of warnings issued by the Chinese Government, the United Nations forces moved toward the Yalu River, marking the North Korean border with Manchuria. Discounting the significance of initial Chinese attacks in late October, MacArthur ordered the UNC to launch an offensive, taking the forces to the Yalu. In late November the Chinese attacked in full strength, pushing the UNC in disarray south of the 38th parallel with the communist forces seizing the South Korean capital, Seoul.

In early 1951 the Chinese offensive lost its momentum and the UNC, bolstered by the revitalized 8th U.S. Army led by General Matthew B. Ridgway, retook Seoul and advanced back to the 38th parallel. From July 1951, until the end of hostilities the battle lines remained relatively stable and the conflict became a stalemate. The Truman Administration abandoned plans to reunite North and South Korea and instead decided to pursue limited goals in order to avoid the possible escalation of the conflict into a third world war involving China and the Soviet Union. When General MacArthur publicly challenged the Truman Administration’s conduct of the war, the President, “…concluded that…MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government…” and relieved him from command in April 1951, replacing him with General Ridgway.

Acting on a campaign pledge, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower went to Korea on December 2, 1952. After visiting the troops, their commanders and South Korean leaders, and receiving briefings on the military situation in Korea, Eisenhower concluded, “we could not stand forever on a static front and continue to accept casualties without any visible results. Small attacks on small hills would not end this war.” President Eisenhower sought an end to hostilities in Korea through a combination of diplomacy and military muscle-flexing. On July 27, 1953, seven months after President Eisenhower’s inauguration as the 34th President of the United States, an armistice was signed, ending organized combat operations and leaving the Korean Peninsula divided much as it had been since the close of World War II at the 38th parallel.

The Korean U.N. “police action” prevented North Korea from imposing its communist rule on South Korea. Also, the United States’ actions in Korea demonstrated America’s willingness to combat aggression, strengthened President Eisenhower’s hand in Europe as he sought to organize European military defense under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and insured that the United States would pursue its military buildup called for in the famous cold war document, National Security Council Policy Paper No. 68.
Presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower makes 1952 campaign pledge, “I shall go to Korea.” Speech, October 24, 1952. [Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Speech Series, Box 2, Oct 23, 1952 to Nov 3, 1952 and Dec 1952 (1); NAID #12012607] https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/korean-war/i-shall-go-to-korea-1952-10-24.pdf
Public opinion on the Korean War, 1953. Memorandum on recent polls, June 2, 1953. [C.D. Jackson Records, Box 4, Korea (3)] https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/korean-war/public-opinion-1953-06-02.pdf
President Eisenhower’s thoughts on the eve of the Korean Armistice signing. Staff note, August 6, 1953. [Records of the White House Staff Secretary, L. Arthur Minnich Series, Box 1, Miscellaneous – K; NAID #12012729] https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/korean-war/armistice-signing-1953-08-06.pdf
The President’s hand-edited draft of his public statement on the occasion of the Armistice, July 26, 1953. [Papers of James C. Hagerty, Box 9, The President-Drafts (3); NAID #12012654] https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/korean-war/armistice-draft-1953-07-26.pdf
President Eisenhower on his administration’s post-Armistice policy toward Korea. Staff note, January 5, 1954. [Records of the White House Staff Secretary, L. Arthur Minnich Series, Box 1, Miscellaneous – K] https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/korean-war/post-armistice-policy-1954-01-05.pdf
Additional Information:
The Korean War and its Origins, 1945-1953 (Truman Presidential Library)
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/korea/index.html
Korean War / U.S.-Korean Relations Subject Guide

Click to access korean-war-and-us-korean-relations.pdf

Korean Armistice Subject Guide
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/subject-guides/pdf/korean-armistice.pdf https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/korean-war

Korean War Polls https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/korean-war/public-opinion-1953-06-02.pdf

“By war’s end, there were, according to estimates, more than 100,000 orphans in the country, and by late 1954, there were more than 400 registered orphanages in the Republic of Korea”. https://www.neh.gov/article/korea-and-thirty-eighth-parallel

“Acheson’s speech on January 12, 1950, before the National Press Club[16] did not mention the Korea Peninsula and Formosa (Taiwan) as part of the all-important “defense perimeter” of the United States. Since the war in Korea broke out on June 25, just a few months later, critics, especially in South Korea, took Acheson’s statements to mean that the United States support for the new Syngman Rhee government in South Korea would be limited and that the speech provided Stalin and Kim Il-sung with a “green light” to believe the U.S. would not intervene if they invaded the South. When Soviet archives opened in the 1980s, however, research found that the speech had little if any impact on Communist decision for war in Korea.[17]” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dean_Acheson

“Michael J. Green of Georgetown University’s school of foreign service said in a telephone interview for this article that an indiscreet remark by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson may have helped trigger the war. In a press conference on January 12, 1950, Acheson, a dapper product of Yale University and Harvard Law School who was discussing other geopolitical actors in Asia, stated that America’s defense policy excluded Korea. “Russian Premier Joseph Stalin in Moscow interpreted Acheson’s declaration as an indication that America possibly would avoid getting into any conflict over Korea,” says Green.” (“Korea and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel”, April 26, 2019 Peter Joffre Nye Humanities, Spring 2019, Volume 40, Number 2 https://www.neh.gov/article/korea-and-thirty-eighth-parallel

“Life on the DMZ” By C. Todd Lopez, special to Soldiers Magazine September 3, 2008 https://www.army.mil/article/12098/life_on_the_dmz

“Tunnel discovery at the DMZ, a monumental achievement by the Far East District” By Chong Yun Kim July 14, 2021 https://www.army.mil/article/248497/

“The United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 was adopted on July 7, 1950. Having determined that the invasion of South Korea by forces from North Korea constituted a breach of the peace, the Council recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the South Korean state as may be necessary to repel the attack and restore peace and security to the area. The Council further recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance to The Republic make these forces and assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America. The Council then requested that the United States designate the commander of such forces and authorized said commander to use the flag of the United Nations at his discretion in the course of operations against North Korean forces. Finally, The Council requested that the United States provide it with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken by the unified command. The resolution passed with the votes from the United Kingdom, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, and the United States. Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia abstained. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, was absent,[1] having been boycotting proceedings since January, in protest that the Republic of China and not the People’s Republic of China held a permanent seat on the council.[2] The Council President at that time was Norwegian Arne Sunde.[1]”https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_84