bat coronaviruses, Brett Guthrie, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, China, Chinese government, coronaviruses, COVID-19, EcoHealth Alliance, EHA, Energy and Commerce, Fauci, FOIA, grant money, H. Morgan Griffith, health, HHS, Judicial Watch, Lancet, NIAID, NIH, oversight, pandemic, Peter Daszak, Republican leaders, SARS CoV, US Congress, US government, WIV, Wuhan, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Wuhan lab Covid-19
The head of the EcoHealth Alliance, Peter Daszak, is Ukrainian-British and used US taxpayer money to work with the Wuhan lab. If this is the origin of Covid-19, then who’s fault is it? The UK? Ukraine? China? The USA? Fauci?
Wuhan Institute of Virology partners listed as
USA: University of Alabama, University of North Texas, EcoHealth Alliance, Harvard University, The National Institutes of Health, the United States National Wildlife Federation;
Canada: International Development Research Center;
Europe: Umé University, Novo Nordisk Research Centre, Université d’Aix-Marseille
University of Duisburg-Essen, Institut Pasteur, France; University of Southampton;
Department of Molecular and Cell Biology, Campus Univ, Spain; St George’s University of London; Wagenigen Agriculture University; Lyon P4 Laboratory, France, AFSSAPS, AFNOR, INSERM Jean Merieux
Asia: Duke-NUS Graduate Medical School Singapore; Biological Research Center, Defense Science and Technology Organization, Pakistan; National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan; Institution Novartis, Singapore; National Engineering and Scientific Commission, Islambad
Africa: Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology; Kenya National Museum
Australia: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization
International Organizations: European Union; Food and Agriculture Organization, UN; World Health Organization https://archive.is/VQUDo#selection-693.0-1383.25
Trump stopped EcoHealth’s funding in April of 2020, because they were working with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and then Fauci apparently doubled their funding to $7.5 million: “EcoHealth’s bat research in China was entirely funded through the $3.7 million NIH grant… The National Institutes of Health has awarded a grant worth $7.5 million over five years to EcoHealth Alliance, a U.S.-based nonprofit that hunts emerging viruses. The award comes months after NIH revoked an earlier grant to EcoHealth…” NPR- Maria Godoy, 8.29.20 https://wfuv.org/content/group-whose-nih-grant-virus-research-was-revoked-just-got-new-grant Their Ukrainian British director, Peter Daszak, “had publicly defended gain-of-function research and co-signed a February 2020 statement published in The Lancet in “to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin.” Later it emerged that he drafted the statement and covertly arranged the 26 co-authors.” https://wikispooks.com/wiki/EcoHealth_Alliance
“E&C Republican Leaders Request Information From U.S. Group Affiliated With Chinese Lab at Center of COVID-19 Origin Investigation 04.16.21
Washington, D.C. — House Energy & Commerce Committee Republican Leader Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Subcommittee on Health Republican Leader Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Republican Leader Morgan Griffith (R-VA) sent a letter Friday afternoon to Dr. Peter Daszak with EcoHealth Alliance (EHA) requesting information and documents that could be useful to a comprehensive investigation into the origins of COVID-19.
Committee Republicans are demanding a thorough and independent investigation be done in order to learn more about how the pandemic started.
EcoHealth Alliance has long partnered with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in researching bat coronaviruses and EHA is the only U.S. partner of the WIV’s eight international cohorts. Additionally, EHA has shared some of the funding it has received from the National Institutes of Health with the WIV for several years.
“We believe through its research activities, collaborations, and EHA’s relationship with the WIV as a federal award subrecipient, that EHA has information and documents that will provide insight into the WIV’s bat coronavirus information and pathways for further research in this area,” the letter says.
The NIH suspended a grant to EHA in July 2020 until certain conditions were met regarding its work with WIV. However, it appears EHA has not cooperated with the NIH since the grant is still shown to be suspended.
The EHA has maintained its belief that a lab leak was not the cause of the coronavirus pandemic. “Since EHA is confident that a lab leak is not the cause, we expect you to welcome the opportunity to share any and all information, documents, and expertise you have related to bat coronavirus research at the WIV,” the letter says.
The leaders are requesting the information be handed over to the Committee by May 17, 2021.
To read the letter, click HERE. https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/EcoHealth-Alliance-Letter.pdf
Note: This request follows a letter sent by Leaders Rodgers, Griffith, and Guthrie to the NIH requesting additional information and for an independent, science-driven investigation to commence. To read the letter to the NIH, click HERE. https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NIH-Investigation-COVID-origins.pdf
SUBCOMMITTEES Health (117th Congress) · Oversight and Investigations (117th Congress)
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/news/ec-republican-leaders-request-information-from-u-s-group-affiliated-with-chinese-lab-at-center-of-covid-19-origin-investigation/
“The drafter of The Lancet statement was none other than the president of EcoHealth Alliance, Peter Daszak. Which means that the very statement that, for many months, shut down open debate on the possible laboratory origin of the China Virus, was actually the product of an organization that was collaborating with the Wuhan lab in the genetic engineering of coronaviruses.“ https://nypost.com/2021/01/16/doctor-who-denied-covid-was-leaked-from-a-lab-had-this-major-bias/
The footnotes to the letter were changed to endnotes, in order to make it more readable.
US Members of Congress (Republican) letter to Peter Daszak of EcoHealth Alliance (emphasis our own):
April 16, 2021
Mr. Peter Daszak, PhD President
460 West 34th Street, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10001
Dear Dr. Daszak:
We write to request information and documents from EcoHealth Alliance (EHA) related to the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, including possible pandemic links to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). 1
EHA has an extensive history with research into bat coronaviruses in China, some of which are presumed progenitors of SARS CoV-2. 2 In addition, EHA has partnered with the WIV in this area of research, and WIV lists EHA as one of its eight international partners, and the only one in the U.S. 3 For example, last year EHA, the WIV, and others co-authored an article on the origin and cross-species transmission of bat coronaviruses in China, and presented phylogenetic analysis suggesting a likely origin of SARS-CoV-2 in horseshoe (Rhinolophus spp.) bats. 4 Further, for several years, EHA has provided some of its National Institutes of Health (NIH) federal funding to WIV as a federal sub-award recipient for bat coronavirus research to conduct high-quality testing, sequencing, field sample analyses, sample storage and testing, and collaboration on scientific publications and programmatic reporting.5 It has been reported that EHA’s China bat research project was funded entirely through NIH awards.6
We believe through its research activities, collaborations, and EHA’s relationship with the WIV as a federal award subrecipient, that EHA has information and documents that will provide insight into the WIV’s bat coronavirus information and pathways for further research in this area.7 We are interested in EHA’s knowledge of and access to the WIV’s virus samples, genomic sequences, and research afforded to EHA as a NIH federal award recipient who established a sub-recipient relationship with the WIV for grants including R01AI110964, and as a subrecipient of NIH awards.8 We are also interested in EHA’s knowledge of and access to a password-protected virus database for which external access ended on September 12, 2019. The database is administered by the WIV’s researcher Dr. Shi Zhengli, with whom you and your team have had professional and financial ties since at least 2003.9 The database is estimated to contain 500 coronaviruses identified by EHA, and at least 100 unpublished sequences of bat beta coronaviruses that are relevant to the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 origin.10
We anticipate that EHA and the WIV share access to samples and virus sequences based on the terms of the NIH grant and based in part on a recent interview discussing the EHA and WIV joint effort to capture 10,000 bats, draw and test their blood, and create a catalogue of all of the viruses, including 50 new coronaviruses.11 You stated that Remdesivir was tested against the viruses EHA and the WIV discovered through NIH funded research, and that Remdesivir testing “would not have been able to happen and we wouldn’t have known how good this drug Remdesivir is” without EHA’s work.12
We are interested in learning about what EHA knows regarding a Chinese national security review team finding in 2019 that the WIV did not meet national standards in five categories and when or if those standards were met before 2020. 13
Additionally, EHA was working with the WIV when in 2016, an independent American review found that China’s biosafety controls had a shortage of officials, experts, and scientists who specialize in laboratory biosafety. 14 As a research partner of WIV, we would expect EHA to have been a first-hand witness to the WIV operations as the China’s first BioSafety Level-4 laboratory.”15
In July 2020, the NIH sought information from EHA related to the WIV, and suspended one of EHA’s grants until certain questions were answered and certain conditions were met, pursuant to EHA’s obligations under the agreement and federal regulations.16 As an NIH federal award recipient, EHA is required to “monitor the activities of the subrecipient as necessary to ensure that the subaward is used for authorized purposes, in compliance with federal statutes, regulations, and the terms and conditions of the subaward.”17 It is EHA’s responsibility to ensure the WIV met all NIH grant requirements. The EHA grant suspended by the NIH in July 2020 remains suspended per NIH public records, suggesting that EHA still has not cooperated with the NIH nor met its federal requirements as an award recipient with mandatory terms and conditions.18 In addition, researchers and scientists in the scientific community have unanswered questions about the WIV, its operations and research activities, and whether a possible lab incident at the WIV could have been related to the origins of SARS-CoV-2.19
EHA officials have repeatedly stated that they do not believe the pandemic was caused by a lab leak and have solicited support for others to advance that position publicly.20 However, there is substantial and increasing support from the international scientific community and public health experts, including from the World Health Organization Director-General Tedros, for further investigation into COVID origins, including the possibility of a lab leak.21 Since EHA is confident that a lab leak is not the cause, we expect you to welcome the opportunity to share any and all information, documents, and expertise you have related to bat coronavirus research at the WIV. Accordingly, to assist our inquiry, please provide the following by May 17, 2021:
Documents and Information Related to NIH Federal Awards
1. Please provide all federal award applications, progress reports, and research or project results prepared for NIH by EHA related to NIH award number R01AI110964.
2. Please provide all financial conflict of interest disclosures, and disclosures of financial foreign support or foreign components prepared for NIH by EHA for NIH award number R01AI110964.
3. Please provide all applications EHA submitted for Potential Pandemic Pathogen research review and the review results.22
4. Please provide all letters, emails, and other communications between EHA and NIH Institutes related to NIH award number R01AI110964, including EHA’s conditions of awards, requests for information, and responses.
5. Please provide all letters, emails, and other communications between EHA and grant sub-recipient, the WIV, related to terms of agreements, bat coronaviruses, genome or genetic sequencing, SARS-CoV-2, and/or laboratory safety practices pursuant to NIH award number R01AI110964.
6. What does EHA know about research involving bat coronaviruses in the WIV laboratories in 2019, including but not limited to: possible bat coronavirus vaccine development; pathogenicity studies involving animal experiments; usage of passaging; Dual-Use Research of Concern; nucleotide synthesis; mutagenesis; genetic manipulation and gain of function techniques?23
7. Please identify all federal awards for which EHA has been an award subrecipient and describe when any of those funds were used to support the WIV or WIV’s activities from 2015 to present.
8. Has any research supported in whole or in part by NIH award number R01AI110964 been published in Mandarin only and is therefore not readily accessible for use by U.S. researchers? If so, please identify such research and articles.
9. Did EHA or the WIV use translators while conducting NIH award number R01AI110964 together? If so, please describe all procurements and other arrangements for translation services, including the identity of the translators.
10. For all NIH funded work, please identify all Mandarin-fluent EHA personnel and English-fluent WIV personnel who worked on the projects related to NIH award number R01AI110964.
11. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. sec. 75.352(d), how does EHA monitor the handling and use of samples by its subrecipient, the WIV, to ensure the sub-award is used for authorized purposes?24
12. Of the bat viruses EHA finds in China, where are samples and the genomic or genetic sequences stored in the United States and how are the samples transported? 25
13. Does EHA have any virus samples or sequences related to the bats or pneumonia-like illness that sickened six miners in the Mojiang mine in southwestern China’s Yunnan Province, killing three, after their work removing bat feces? 26 If so, please provide the location and identification information for the samples and/or sequences.
14. In 2020, Dr. Shi Zhengli of WIV published a genomic sequence for RaTG13. According to available information first published in 2016, RaTG13 is 96.2 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2 and was gathered in 2012 from bat caves in the Yunnan Province, then. 27 This sequence is the most similar to SARS-CoV2 that is publicly known.
a. Why was the sample sequence not published until 2020?
b. Does EHA have any reason to know if RaTG13 was ever used in research at WIV, including gain of function studies?
c. Does EHA have any other sequences or samples from the bat cave that were collected from the Yunnan bat caves in 2012?
d. Does EHA have the WIV genome that corroborates their renaming of RaBtCoV/4991 to RaTG13?28
e. Does EHA have the genome or genetic sequences of the eight other related coronaviruses found in the same mine (the 7896 clade) that can be seen in slides shown by Dr. Shi Zhengli in webinars?29 If so, please provide.
15. In addition to the eleven SARS-related bat coronavirus sequences EHA and the WIV discovered in Yunnan Province, have any other genomic or genetic sequences for bat coronaviruses resulting from EHA’s five-year surveillance of SARS-CoVs in Yunnan Province bat caves, funded in part by NIH, been deposited in GenBank? If so, what accession numbers have been assigned to these sequences?30
16. Does EHA have copies of the virus samples and sequences maintained in Dr. Shi Zhengli’s database that was taken offline in September 2019?31 If so, please describe what EHA has in this collection, and to what extent EHA would make this collection publicly available.
17. EHA has stated that it has unpublished data gathered over 15 years of working in China, and five years under a previous NIH grant.32 Please describe these records and to what extent EHA will make these publicly available.
18. Prior to April 2020, did EHA have access to the WIV databases that were made possible in whole or in part by NIH award number R01AI110964?
19. It was reported that EHA and the WIV caught and sampled the blood of 10,000 bats, resulting in a discovery of 50 new coronaviruses and creating of a virus genomes catalog.33
Please produce a copy of this virus genomes catalog created by EHA and the WIV.
20. The EHA and WIV collected 15,000 bat samples, of which a subset of 50 bat samples “fall into a category that caused the 2002 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and, now, the COVID-19 pandemic.”34
a. How many of that 50-sample subset are closely related to SARS-CoV-2?
b. Please provide any identifying information for each sample in this category.
21. External access ended on September 12, 2019, to the WIV password protected Batvirus.whiov.ac.cn database containing at least 100 unpublished bat virus sequences, for which Dr. Shi Zhengli is the administrator.35
a. Did the WIV solely maintain the database related to research conducted under NIH funding or is the database jointly maintained by EHA and the WIV?
b. Does EHA maintain an independent database from the WIV related to research conducted under NIH funding?
22. Does EHA have copies of a virus database portal, created by China’s National Virus Resource Center in Beijing, which is affiliated with the WIV?36 If so, describe these records, and to what extent EHA will make these publicly available.
23. Please identify research project(s) that tested Remdesivir on the viruses EHA discovered through its NIH-funded research and identify which EHA-discovered viruses were used.37
24. A patent application related to use of Remdesivir and chloroquine in the treatment for COVID-19 was submitted jointly by the WIV with the Military Medicine Institute of the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science in January 2020.38 Were samples or sequences derived from EHA’s work with the WIV used in research for this patent? If so, please describe the samples or sequences used.
Documents and Information Related to EHA and the WIV Research Facilities
25. Does EHA maintain its own laboratories? If so, what are the biosafety levels (BSL) for these laboratories, and have researchers from the WIV worked there? If so, please describe the type of research conducted at these laboratories, and at what BSL.
26. Was the WIV lab work funded by EHA carried out at BSL-2, BSL-3 or BSL-4 level? If WIV work was carried out at various BSLs, please explain what type of work was conducted at each of the different BSLs.
27. What types of animal models does WIV work with?
a. Are the animals housed in separate facilities with separate ventilation systems?
b. Was the animal work performed in an Animal Biosafety Level (ABSL) laboratory, and if so, at what Biosafety Level ?
28. Did the WIV have any laboratory environmental monitoring or surveillance program in place to minimize hazards to employees in 2019? If so, please provide details and include all WIV violations for which EHA has direct or indirect knowledge.
29. What engineering and administrative controls as well as Personal Protective Equipment were observed or leveraged at WIV in 2019? Please provide details and include all times for which EHA has direct or indirect knowledge when safety protocols were not followed.
30. Please provide a list of all the coronaviruses that the WIV laboratories were working with in 2019 related to NIH award number R01AI110964.
EHA Financial Reporting
31. The Wall Street Journal reported that EHA received a July 8, 2020 letter from NIH suspending award number R01AI110964 pending seven conditions reported by Nature, but not all of those demands were specified in the Nature article.39 Did one of the unspecified conditions of grant reinstatement relate to reporting of subawards or reporting about subrecipients?
a. EHA is required to file end-of-month reports into the Federal Subaward Reporting System (FSRS) following its issuance of sub-grant awards, then the report becomes publicly available on the USAspending.gov website, which is the official open source of federal spending.40 Five days after the NIH July 8, 2020 letter, according to
USAspending.gov records, EHA entered multiple years of reports all on July 13, 2020, for NIH award number R01AI110964 subrecipients into the FSRS.41 Does EHA’s July 13, 2020 data modifications in USA Spending reflect actions taken in response to the July 8, 2020 NIH letter requesting EHA’s compliance with its award terms and responsibilities?
32. EHA reported a $195,498 cash award disbursed by wire to “Institute of Microbiology of Chinese Institute of” for “Grants and Assistance to Individuals Outside the U.S.” on its IRS Form 990, calendar year 2019.42 Please provide the full name and address of this recipient institution, the nature of its relationship with EHA, and whether this institution has any relation to the WIV.
a. Please identify U.S. government source(s) or agency for the $195,498 award, if applicable.
33. EHA reported a $319,570 cash award grant and a $126,792 cash award grant disbursed by wire to China for the purpose of “[u]understanding the risk of bat coronavirus emergence” on its IRS Form 990, calendar year 2016.43 The name of the organizations receiving the awards were left blank.44 Please provide the full name and address of the organization(s) that received these cash award grants.45
a. What is relationship between these organizations and EHA? Are these organizations related to the WIV?
b. Please identify the U.S. government source(s) or agency for the $319,570 award and the $126,792 award, if applicable.
34. EHA reported a $291,507 cash award disbursed by wire transfer to an unnamed recipient in China for “Grants and Assistance to Individuals Outside the U.S.” on its calendar year 2016, IRS Form 990.46 The grant assistance was described as “Coronavirus & Emerging Diseases.”47 Please provide the full name and address of the recipient, the relationship between the recipient and EHA, and whether the recipient has any relationship to the WIV.
a. Please identify the U.S. government source(s) or agency for the $291,507 award, if applicable.
After the requested information has been provided, we ask that EHA provide a briefing to Minority Committee staff to discuss the information that EHA has related to COVID-19 origins and WIV. Your assistance with this request is greatly appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact Alan Slobodin or Diane Cutler of the Minority Committee staff.
Cathy McMorris Rodgers Brett Guthrie Republican Leader Republican Leader Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health
H. Morgan Griffith Republican Leader Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
CC: The Honorable Frank Pallone, Chairman The Honorable Anna Eshoo, Chair, Subcommittee on Health The Honorable Diana DeGette, Chair, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
1 All references to the WIV include the former names of the Chinese establishment, that include the Wuhan Institute of Microbiology, the Wuhan Microbiology Research Laboratory, the Hubei Provincial Institute of Microbiology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS, About WIV (last accessed Apr. 9, 2021), available at https://archive.is/c90qj http://english.whiov.cas. cn/About_Us2016/Brief_Introduction2016/.
2 Latinne, A., Hu, B., Olival, K.J. et al., Origin and cross-species transmission of bat coronaviruses in China, Nature (Aug. 25, 2020), available at https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17687-3.
3 Id.; Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS, Partnerships Wuhan Institute of Virology Chinese Academy of Sciences (last accessed Apr. 8, 2021), available at
https://archive.is/VQUDo http://english.whiov.cas. cn/International_Cooperation2016/Partnerships/.
4 Id.; EHA and WIV officials, with others, also co-authored other articles related to Bat SARS-Related Coronavirus. Wang N, Li SY, Yang XL, et al., Serological Evidence of Bat SARS-Related Coronavirus Infection in Humans, China. Virol Sin. 2018;33(1):104-107 (Mar. 2, 2018), available at doi:10.1007/s12250-018-0012-7.
5 USASpending, EcoHealth Alliance Sub-Awards (last accessed Apr. 8, 2021), available at https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_R01AI110964_7529. 6 Nurith Aizenman, Why the U.S. Government Stopped Funding A Research Project On Bats And Coronaviruses (Apr. 29, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/29/847948272/why-the-u-s-government-stopped-funding-a-research-project-on-bats-and-coronaviru. 7 USAspending, EcoHealth Alliance Sub-Awards (last accessed Apr. 8, 2021), available at https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_R01AI110964_7529.
8 Id., USAspending, The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York – Award U19AI109761, (last accessed Apr. 12, 2021) available at https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_U19AI109761_7529/. 9 Josh Rogin, Opinion: The coronavirus crisis shows the risks of scientific collaboration with China, The Washington Post, (Apr. 23, 2020) available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-coronavirus-crisis-shows-the-risks-of-scientific-collaboration-with-china/2020/04/23/4ccd5850-85a8-11ea-878a-86477a724bdb_story.html. 10 Julie Zaugg, The virus hunters who search bat caves to predict the next pandemic, CNN health (Apr. 26, 2020) available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/26/health/virus-hunters-bat-cave-coronavirus-hnk-intl/index.html. 11 Why It Matters That The NIH Cancelled a Coronavirus Research Grant, CBS 60 MINUTES (May 10, 2020), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nih-cancelled-coronavirus-research-grant-60-minutes-2020-05-10/. 12 Id. 13 John Xie, Chinese Lab with Checkered Safety Record Draws Scrutiny over COIVD-19, VOA News, (Apr. 21, 2020) available at https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/chinese-lab-checkered-safety-record-draws-scrutiny-over-covid-19. EHA’s NIH grant is subject to biosafety requirements pursuant to NIH Grants Policy Statement and Notice of Award.
15 Gilles Demaneuf, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: a review of SARS Lab Escapes (Nov. 16, 2020) available at https://gillesdemaneuf.medium.com/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-a-review-of-sars-lab-escapes-898d203d175d.
16 Betsy McKay, NIH Presses U.S. Nonprofit for Information on Wuhan Virology Lab, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 19, 2020), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/nih-presses-u-s-nonprofit-for-information-on-wuhan-virology-lab-11597829400.
17 45 C.F.R. § 75.352(d).
18 EcoHealth Alliance, Statement on the Latest Development Regarding EcoHealth Alliance’s Coronavirus Research Funding (last accessed Apr. 8, 2021), available at https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/2020/08/statement-on-the-latest-development-regarding-ecohealth-alliances-coronavirus-research-funding.
19 Betsy McKay, NIH Presses U.S. Nonprofit for Information on Wuhan Virology Lab, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Aug. 19, 2020), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/nih-presses-u-s-nonprofit-for-information-on-wuhan-virology-lab-11597829400; Justine Coleman, Scientists call for new investigation into coronavirus origins (Apr. 7, 2021), available at https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/546988-scientists-call-for-new-investigation-into-coronavirus-origins; Editorial Board, Opinion: The WHO needs to start over in investigating the origins of the coronavirus, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-who-needs-to-start-over-in-investigating-the-origins-of-the-coronavirus/2021/03/05/6f3d5a0e-7de9-11eb-a976-c028a4215c78_story.html.
20 Sainath Suryanarayanan, Emails show scientists discussed masking their involvement in key journal letter on Covid origins (Feb. 15, 2021), available at https://usrtk.org/biohazards-blog/scientists-masked-involvement-in-lancet-letter-on-covid-origin/.
21 Emily Rauhala, WHO chief, U.S. and other world leaders criticize China for limiting access of team researching coronavirus origins, The Washington Post (Mar. 30, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/who-wuhan-tedros-lab/2021/03/30/896fe3f6-90d1-11eb-aadc-af78701a30ca_story.html; and Charles Schmidt, Did the coronavirus leak from a lab? These scientists say we shouldn’t rule it out, Biotechnology (Mar. 18, 2001), available at https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/18/1021030/coronavirus-leak-wuhan-lab-scientists-conspiracy/.
22 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Framework for Guiding Funding Decisions about Proposed Research Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (2017), available at https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/p3co.pdf.
23 U.S. National Institutes of Health, Dual-Use Research (Sept. 9, 2019), available at https://oir.nih.gov/sourcebook/ethical-conduct/special-research-considerations/dual-use-research#:~:text=Dual%20Use%20Research%20of%20Concern,to%20public%20health%20and%20safety%2C.
24 45 C.F.R. sec. 75.352(d).
25 Nurith Aizenman, Why the U.S. Government Stopped Funding A Research Project On Bats And Coronaviruses, (Apr. 29, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/29/847948272/why-the-u-s-government-stopped-funding-a-research-project-on-bats-and-coronaviru.
26 Rahalkar MC, Bahulikar RA, Lethal Pneumonia Cases in Mojiang Miners (2012) and the Mineshaft Could Provide Important Clues to the Origin of SARS-CoV-2 (Oct. 20, 2020), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7606707/. 27Peng Zhou, et al, Discovery of a novel coronavirus associated with the recent pneumonia outbreak in humans and its potential bat origin, (Jan. 23, 2020) available at https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.01.22.914952v2.full.pdf.
28 Liji Thomas, Scientists claim serious data discrepancies in RaTG13 sequence, (Sept. 10, 2020) available at https://www.news-medical.net/news/20200910/Scientists-claim-serious-data-discrepancies-in-RaTG13-sequence.aspx.
29 European Scientific Working Group on Influenza, ESWI 2020 keynote lecture Zhengli Shi:From SARS to COVID-19, understanding the interspecies transmission of SARS-related coronaviruses (Sept. 16, 2020), available at https://eswi.org/eswi-tv/eswi2020-keynote-lecture-zhengli-shi-from-sars-to-covid-19-understanding-the-interspecies-transmission-of-sars-related-coronaviruses/.
30 Ben Hu, et al, Discovery of a rich gene pool of bat SARS-related coronaviruses provides new insights into the origin of SARS coronavirus, PLOS PATHOGENS (Nov. 30, 2017), available at https://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/article?id=10.1371/journal.ppat.1006698.
31 Nurith Aizenman, Why the U.S. Government Stopped Funding A Research Project On Bats And Coronaviruses, (Apr. 29, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/29/847948272/why-the-u-s-government-stopped-funding-a-research-project-on-bats-and-coronaviru.
32 Nidhi Subbaraman, ‘Heinous!’: Coronavirus researcher shut down for Wuhan-lab link slams new funding restrictions, Nature (Aug. 21, 2020), available at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02473-4.
33 Why It Matters That The NIH Cancelled a Coronavirus Research Grant, CBS 60 MINUTES (May 10, 2020), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nih-cancelled-coronavirus-research-grant-60-minutes-2020-05-10/.
34 Nurith Aizenman, Why the U.S. Government Stopped Funding A Research Project On Bats And Coronaviruses, (Apr. 29, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/29/847948272/why-the-u-s-government-stopped-funding-a-research-project-on-bats-and-coronaviru.
35 Julie Zaugg, The virus hunters who search bat caves to predict the next pandemic, CNN health (Apr. 26, 2020) available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/26/health/virus-hunters-bat-cave-coronavirus-hnk-intl/index.html.
36 Editorial Board, We’re still missing the origin story of this pandemic. China is sitting on the answers, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/05/coronavirus-origins-mystery-china/?arc404=true.
37 Why It Matters That The NIH Cancelled a Coronavirus Research Grant, CBS 60 MINUTES (May 10, 2020), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nih-cancelled-coronavirus-research-grant-60-minutes-2020-05-10/.
38 Mark Terry, China’s Wuhan Institute Files to Patent the Use of Gilead’s Remdesivir for Coronavirus, Biospace (Feb. 5, 2020), available at https://www.biospace.com/article/china-s-wuhan-institute-files-to-patent-the-use-of-gilead-s-remdesivir-for-coronavirus/.
39 Betsy McKay, NIH Presses U.S. Nonprofit for Information on Wuhan Virology Lab, The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 19, 2020), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/nih-presses-u-s-nonprofit-for-information-on-wuhan-virology-lab-11597829400; Niddhi Subbaraman, ‘Heinous!’: Coronavirus Researcher shut down for Wuhan-lab link slams new funding restrictions, NATURE (Aug. 21, 2020), available at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02473-4.
40 USAspending.gov, About (2021) available at https://www.usaspending.gov/. See Attachment A to this letter.
41 USAspending.gov, EcoHealth Alliance Sub-Awards (last accessed Apr. 8, 2021), available at https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_R01AI110964_7529.
42 Jessica Newman, Preventing the next global pandemic with EcoHealth Alliance, Global Impact (Aug. 31, 2020), https://charity.org/give-global-blog/preventing-next-global-pandemic-ecohealth-alliance.
43 EcoHealth Alliance, EHA 990 final 2019, Schedule E, Parts I and II (Feb. 2018), available at https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/EHA-990-final-2016.pdf.
44 Id., Schedule F, Part II.
46 EcoHealth Alliance, EHA 990 final 2019, Schedule F, Part III (Feb. 2018), available at https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/EHA-990-final-2016.pdf.
47 Id. “See original letter here: https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/EcoHealth-Alliance-Letter.pdf