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Apart from Trump mega-donors Sheldon and Miriam Adelson; Paul Singer; and Bernard Marcus[1], there is at least one other Trump-Republican donor-supporter who is probably influencing Trump’s policy on Iran. And, who may want regime change. That is a former Iranian government official who now holds US citizenship: Hushang Ansary. There are almost certainly more.

“March, 5 1975
The United States And Iran Sign A 15 Billion Dollar Trade Agreement
Iranian Finance Minister Hushang Ansary says that “Iran is the first major oil producing country to go nuclear in a major way.” [2]

Link: https://youtu.be/pwciONMbTZA

Who is Hushang Ansary/Ansari?
“Ansary is a devoted Republican, a former friend and business partner of Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, and James Baker, served on the National Finance Committee of the Bush-Cheney 2004 Presidential Campaign and is a trustee of the George W. Bush Presidential Library. In 2015, Ansary and his wife donated $2 million to a Super PAC supporting the presidential candidacy of Jeb Bush. ” [3]

He then supported Trump. He served as trustee for the Trump Victory joint fundraising committee and, along with his wife, gave $2 million to the Trump Inaugural Committee:
“Last month, in launching the Trump Victory joint fundraising committee, the RNC unveiled a list of nearly two dozen vice chairs and trustees who were tasked with helping raise money… “They asked me to agree to serve as a trustee, and I’ve agreed to do that,” said Hushang Ansary, a Houston businessman…” [4]

Trump mega-donor and casino magnate Sheldon Adelson gave $5 mllion to Trump’s inaugural committee. Hushang Ansary and his wife Shahla gave a total of $2 million. [5]

“Hushang Ansary (Persian: ‫هوشنگ انصاری‬‎, born July 1926) is an Iranian-Americanformer diplomat, businessman, and philanthropist. He served for eighteen years in the Iranian government prior to the Iranian Revolution including as Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance and Iran’s Ambassador to the United States from 1967-1969. He has been chairman or director of companies both in Iran and in the United States…. In November 1977, Ansary became the director of the National Iranian Oil Company, but resigned one year later and moved to the United States, citing health problems…” [6]

In a 1978 article on corruption in Iran, the Washington Post reported:
“Notably absent from Iran during the recent turmoil and subsequent investigations are such key figures as practically the entire royal family, except for the shah and his wife and their children, oil boss Hushang Ansary and dozens of inner circle businessmen and associates accused of financial irregularities.”[7]

We really do not know who Hushang Ansary is. We find an H. Ansary in notes for the BCCI investigation summary, but don’t know if it is the same, nor if he had any role in the scandals. It may be in the detailed documents. We don’t know if he was involved in Iran-Contra, or not. Some have suggested that he hid money for the Shah, while others imply that he might have been involved in overthrowing the Shah. CIA asset? Regardless, he appears to have gotten out of Iran, just in time.

The Shah of Iran was going to build between 20 and 24 nuclear power stations, but after the Iranian Revolution these were cancelled:
“The Shah also planned to spend an estimated $33 billion (some experts say probably three times as much) for the construction of some twenty nuclear reactors by 1994. If constructed with German, French and American aid, they would have made Iran the largest producer of nuclear energy in the entire Indian Ocean area.” These were cancelled after the Iranian Revolution: “In the drastic cutback budget… new military equipment purchases are cut to zero (with the F-14s and Phoenix missiles sold back to the United States) and on-going operations and maintenance are kept well below the levels needed in 1979 to deal with domestic disturbances; all twenty-four nuclear reactors are cancelled (including the four contracts with Framatome and Kraftwerk Union that have already been let)…” [8]

“88. Memorandum of Conversation1
Tehran, November 2, 1974, 9:40–10:35 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
* Mr. Hushang Ansary, Iranian Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance
* Dr. Etemad, Deputy to Prime Minister for Atomic Energy Affairs
* Mr. Mustoufi, Petroleum Industry
* Mr. Vafa, Under Secretary for International Affairs, Ministry of Economics
* Dr. Hatef, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
* Rear Admiral Ardnan, President of Electronics Industry
* Mrs. Rouhi, Director General, Ministry of Communications
* Mr. Fardshisheh, Special Assistant, Minister of Industry
* Ambassador Sadri, Protocol
* Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
* Ambassador Richard Helms, U.S. Ambassador to Iran
* Mr. Alfred Atherton, Jr. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
* Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
* Mr. Robert Oakley, NSC Staff
* Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations
* Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
* Mr. Miklos, DCM
SUBJECT
* First Meeting of US–Iran Joint Commission
[The Secretary flew from the Guest House to the Foreign Ministry by helicopter and then traveled by motorcade to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. Greeted by Minister Ansary, the Secretary and Ambassador Helms conferred privately in the Minister’s Office from 9:30–9:40 a.m., and then joined the larger group in the conference room.]….

ANSARY: “In our opinion, the field of nuclear energy is one of the most important areas. This includes nuclear reactors and plants, uranium enrichment, and also training of manpower. Already an extensive dialogue is going on, and we can iron out the difficulties.

In the field of agriculture, we are prepared to go extensively into cooperation both in Iran and third countries for solution of the food shortage. With India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, we have already started in fertilizer production.3 We would welcome your assistance.

We are also interested in a long-term agreement with the United States to meet some of the requirements of our country in this area. We are looking beyond the immediate supply situation, and arrangements should be possible that are of advantage to both, regardless of fluctuations in the world supply and demand.
In addition, more extensive contact with NASA on a more direct basis would be helpful to us.

Let me turn now to industry. Of particular importance is the development of a modern electronics industry, manufacture of steel through new processes, aluminum industry, ferrochrome and ferromanganese, and transfer of technology and manpower training. In these fields, and the petrochemical field, we not only are prepared for joint ventures in Iran but also to go into third markets with the United States making the maximum use of the comparative advantages of both for mutual benefit…”

KISSINGER:
“No doubt we will find other areas. But let me say:
On nuclear energy, we talked privately before. We have a concern to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and therefore a concern to avoid countries who get nuclear technology from spreading into weaponry. So far we are fortunate that the weapons are now in the hands of countries who are either responsible or cowardly [Laughter]—one or the other. But we can’t count on this. The world is tense enough as it is without compounding it.
[Page 264]
This doesn’t affect your program on peaceful uses; it has to do with the safeguards. We strongly support your program.
Agriculture is a field I’ve discussed with His Imperial Majesty last night.4 I had the impression he shares our view that world food, like energy and inflation, is a major world problem for cooperation, and that Iran can play a major role. We didn’t go into detail, but I think Iran could act as the center for the whole region for advanced technology, for example, fertilizer, and resources for investment in the area. We would be prepared to deal with Iran in this spirit to see how we can be helpful, not only with Iran’s national problem, but beyond this, how Iran can help organize the food needs of the whole region. One subcommittee could do this.
The Minister mentioned a long-term agreement to meet the needs of Iran. In principle, we would be receptive, but I need a clear idea of what he had in mind.
The Minister mentioned NASA. Is this in connection with agriculture? We are now using satellites for surveying and forecasting. We will share the results certainly with Iran. If you have in mind space cooperation, in principle we don’t exclude it. But at a minimum, for the use of space techniques for stimulating agricultural production, I can tell you now we would be prepared to design joint projects.
The perspectives for industry—again, we should get our people together and ask them to think in big terms. Because what you said is in principle the direction we think we should go.
I say this in a spirit of self-criticism—we ought to give this Commission and Iran–US relations the forward thrust implicit in your remarks. But in 1969, His Imperial Majesty first said to me the importance of increasing Iran’s oil production from four million barrels to 6. I owe it to our Iranian friends to point out that I submitted this proposal to our experts, who said this was a sly Iranian trick to capture a bigger share of the limited oil market and to squeeze the Arabs out. The Shah said we could have most of this new production. This sounds ridiculous today. Our Iranian friends were 100% right, and we were 100% wrong. So we should look ahead into the real future, not just project a little bit forward like bureaucrats…” https://archive.li/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d88

“FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXVII, IRAN; IRAQ, 1973–1976
183. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
Tehran, August 8, 1976, 0911Z.
7977. For Secretary’s Eyes Only. Department please pass immediately. Subj: Secretary’s Audience with Shah.2
Set forth below, to be sent to the President,3 is a proposed draft of the highlights of your audience with the Shah as per your request: Begin text
(1) My audience with the Shah after lunch August 6 at his guest house in Nowshahr on the Caspian Sea lasted the better part of three hours. It was followed by a press conference which I asked the Shah to conduct for the American newspapermen traveling with me.4 The audience took place in an atmosphere of warmth, cordiality and privacy. (Ambassador Helms was the only other individual present.) There were no interruptions so that our discussion was frank and intensive. The Shah particularly asked me to convey to you his warmest regards,
[Page 548]
and he spoke with obvious conviction about his personal feeling toward you and the importance he attaches to this relationship.
(2) I took the occasion of the audience to cover with the Shah certain of the points I intended to make that evening in my toast at the formal dinner given at the Foreign Ministry by Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Hushang Ansary.5 I wanted to be sure that nothing I would say would be an embarrassment to Iran. The Shah’s reaction was positive. He encouraged me to speak out. I felt that the thrust given in the press to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee Report on arms sales to Iran6 required a prompt statement which set the United States/Iranian relationship in proper historical and current perspective, believing strongly that we cannot afford to permit an atmosphere of ambivalence to develop about an ally who has been as consistently supportive of US foreign policy over the years as has Iran. (You have the text of my toast as finally delivered.)
(3) During the audience the Shah agreed to a formulation on the issue of nuclear reprocessing which the next day we hammered out with American and Iranian experts into an approach which I think will be adaptable not only to Iran but to other countries who wish to buy nuclear reactors.7 Rather than attempting to set down here the details of this formulation I would prefer to cover the whole matter with you when I return to Washington, because I believe that you will be interested in the possibilities it holds for dealing with key Congressional figures like Senators Ribicoff, Javits, Glenn, Percy, etc. Sievering of ERDA and Kratzer of State participated in the discussions and will be working in the remaining days of this trip to try to refine what we have in mind and what we hope to achieve. I was encouraged by this aspect of my Tehran consultations.
(4) The Shah and I discussed at some length the best tactics for handling notification to Congress of Iran’s intention to purchase the F–16 aircraft. The Shah is obviously anxious to acquire some of his 300 F–16s (160 plus others over time) as soon as possible since his F–14s will lack F–16 support until deliveries are made. The Shah underlined, as he has so frequently in the past, that he wants to keep his Air Force supplied entirely with American equipment. He made it clear that he does not want to introduce into his Air Force airplanes of any other nation but he subtly pointed out that the reluctance of the United States to make deliveries would oblige him to go elsewhere. He noted that Israel has offered for sale to Iran almost any Israeli military equipment Iran wants. (We know that Iranian Vice Minister of War, General Toufanian, recently visited Israel and looked over its arsenal.) The Shah added that President Giscard would be making a State visit to Tehran in early October and that he hoped the F–16 question will have been decided by that time since he is under constant pressure from the French to purchase Mirages. I assured the Shah that I would discuss this matter with you and that we would make the decision as to when to place the F–16 purchase before Congress.
(5) The Shah raised with me the same questions about electronic countermeasures that Ambassador Zahedi had earlier taken up with Brent Scowcroft.8 I went over carefully the problems we have in Washington with the general request that Iran be put on the same basis as NATO. I recommended to the Shah that rather than approaching the problem in this fashion, he ask us for specific items of ECM gear arguing his needs and requirements for each one. I assured him that we would give serious consideration to a few high-priority items at a time and that these requests should be handled securely either through Ambassador Helms or to Scowcroft and to Eagleburger at the Department. The following day I informed General Toufanianof our willingness to make available one particular item that the Iranians desired. Scowcroft’s message on this subject was most timely and enabled me to show the Iranians that we were attempting to move cooperatively on their requests in this sensitive area.
(6) The Shah and I discussed the oil barter negotiations between Iran and various American weapons manufacturers. I pointed out the concern felt in some quarters of Washington that Iranian purchases of voting stock in American oil companies might be regarded as undesirable. The Shah hastened to assure me that he did not rpt not want any stock in Ashland or the New England Power Company (NEPCO), both of which are involved with General Dynamics and Litton in that particular negotiation. He said that Ashland and NEPCO had offered stock but that Iran would not under any circumstances accept the offer. On the Occidental Oil Company agreement which has been so much publicized, the Shah indicated that thus far the deal is not working. It appears that Occidental is making certain conditions which the Iranians are not prepared to accept. These matters are still in the early stages of negotiation and the deal is in no sense finalized. The Shah made the additional point, however, that the United States should make up its mind to what extent it is going to permit foreign purchases of voting stock in oil companies. Under existing circumstances, he commented, there are no guidelines. He emphasized that in such matters he would scrupulously abide by the stated wishes of the United States Government.
(7) On the question of CIEC deliberations, I went carefully over the problems which we feel that Iranian attitudes are causing in these meetings.9 The Shah listened carefully and indicated that he was not aware that the Iranian position on the issue of rescheduling debts was causing difficulties. He then launched into a justification of oil prices, a detailed presentation of price increases on military and industrial equipment in the United States, and his abiding desire to work out some kind of an arrangement with the United States which would permit the special relationship between the two countries to flourish in an atmosphere of inflation and continually rising prices. He spoke of the various suggestions he has made such as indexation, barter arrangements, bilateral oil agreements, and so forth. He repeated again that the present price of oil has still not forced the United States to get serious about developing alternative sources of energy.
(8) I covered with the Shah the proposal that I intend to make to Prime Minister Bhutto on the Pakistan reprocessing plant issue, i.e., that we will provide A7 aircraft in exchange for his willingness to drop the idea of acquiring the plant from France.10 The Shah felt that this was a good proposal and that Bhutto would be wise to accept it. He pointed out again how weak militarily Pakistan is and how much it needs help from the United States.
(9) I had ample opportunity to cover with the Shah our detailed views of the situation in the Middle East and on developments in the area including the shifting alignments of Arab countries. As you will have recognized in recent months, the Shah’s perceptions are almost
[Page 551]
identical with our own. He particularly agrees that Syria must not fail in Lebanon, that the Palestinians must be cut down to size, and that Egyptian policy must not be permitted to so weaken Syria that it brings about a “radical crescent” of Syria and Iraq backed by the PLO and the Libyans. The Shah confirmed that he had had an unpublicized visit from Prime Minister Rabin in mid-July and that Rabin had made it clear Israel was not unhappy about current developments in Lebanon. The Shah and I discussed the viability of a Geneva Conference and agreed that we had similar difficulties in visualizing how one would conduct such a conference and what parties should participate at least in the initial stages.
(10) Africa came in for detailed discussion. We agreed on the general approach and on the fact that it is one area where we should be able to fend off Soviet influence since there is no Israeli problem to frustrate our relationship with friendly countries and tribal elements holding Western allegiances. The Shah has agreed to receive Rhodesian nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo when he comes to Iran in a week or so. He will see what he can do to help him since he agrees with us that Nkomo represents a political element which we should support. End of text.
Helms
1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840114–1442. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
2. Atherton provided Kissinger with briefing material for this meeting on July 31. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–154, Iran Trips, 5–8 August 1976, Briefing Book F1)
3. Scowcroft passed Kissinger’s report of the meeting to the President on August 9. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 40, Kissinger Trip File, August 4–11, 1976—London, Tehran, Kabul, Islamabad, Deauville, The Hague, HAK Messages for the President)
4. The transcript of Kissinger’s joint press conference with the Shah on August 6 at Nowshahr is in telegram Secto 20064 from Tehran, August 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D760305–0422)
5. See footnote 3, Document 181.
6. See footnote 4, Document 179.
7. The report of the Atomic Energy Committee of the Joint Economic Commission is in telegram Secto 20055 from Tehran, August 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D760305–0207)
8. In backchannel message WH61035 to Tehran, August 1, Scowcroft notified Helms that Zahedi had approached him regarding the possibility of Iran receiving access to electronic warfare equipment on a par with NATO. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–153, Iran, Chronological Files, 1 August–1 November 1976)
9. According to a checklist that Atherton and Oakley provided for Kissinger’s talks with the Shah, August 5, Iran was pressing for indexation of oil prices and across-the-board debt relief for the poorer LDC’s, in part to divert their dissatisfaction from the financial assistance they were getting from Iran and other oil producers. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff: Convenience Files, Box 5, Iran (11))
10. See footnote 3, Document 173. In telegram Secto 20089, August 8, Kissingersent Robinson the three options for Iran’s nuclear reprocessing needs that he had presented to the Shah: a binational plant with the United States as partner, an acceptable third country partner, or an exchange with the United States of irradiated fuel for fresh fuel. Kissinger made clear, however, that reprocessing on a purely national basis was not acceptable. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840169–0666) Robinsonfollowed up with the Secretary on this topic on August 18. (Ibid., P850126–2020) U.S.-Iranian nuclear cooperation remained under negotiation until the end of the Ford administration. https://archive.li/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d18
“Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972
Released by the Office of the Historian
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Washington, D.C. 20520 

January 30, 1969

 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

 Subject: Your Meeting with Iranian Ambassador Ansary, Friday, January 31, 1969, at 3:00 p.m.:

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

Ambassador Ansary is calling on you prior to his departing on February 4 to consult with the Shah who is now vacationing in Switzerland. Enclosed are a biography of the Ambassador and a summary statement of our relations with Iran.

Ambassador Ansary’s primary purpose in calling on you is undoubtedly to get an indication of the new Administration’s attitude toward Iran which he can report to the Shah. Before he departs for Switzerland, he is also calling on Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson and on Secretary of Interior Hickel.

In the event that the Ambassador raises with you specific bilateral matters, we suggest that you respond by saying that you will look into them. He may raise the matter of our military credit program for Iran; following receipt of necessary economic data from the Government of Iran, we expect to be in a position to make policy recommendations in March. He may also raise Iran’s desire to export additional oil to the United States, a subject he will undoubtedly raise with Secretary Hickel and which involves our import quota policy.

We suggest that you tell the Ambassador that you know of the President’s admiration for the progress Iran has made under the Shah’s leadership and of the President’s desire to strengthen our close ties with Iran. You might refer with pleasure to your brief meeting with Prime Minister Hoveyda in December. If the Ambassador raises the Shah’s desire, expressed in his letter of January 22 to the President, to meet soon with the President, you might say we are giving the matter serious attention and that the President hopes to reply soon.
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
1. Biography of the Ambassador of Iran
2. Summary Statement of Our Relations with Iran

U.S. RELATIONS WITH IRAN
I. U.S. Interests in Iran
The principal United States interest in Iran derives from Iran’s strategic location on the Soviet border and athwart the air and communications routes from Europe to South Asia and the Far East. We have an interest in keeping this strategic territory out of Soviet hands and in using it for our own strategic purposes. We also have an interest in maintaining close ties with an increasingly powerful Iran so as to influence Iranian policies in the direction of promoting stability in the Middle East. We also have specific commercial interests, primarily in petroleumm, but also increasingly in other fields as well as Iran’s economy grows.
II. Current State of U.S.-Iranian Relations
Our relations with Iran have been for many years and remain today close and intimate. We have maintained this relationship through a transitional period in recent years during which we have ended grant economic assistance to Iran and shifted our military aid from grant to credit sales and during which Iran had adopted a more independent foreign policy of its own, demonstrated especially by improved relations and economic and military deals with the Soviet Union. Iran’s basic orientation remains with the West, and Iran continues to rely on the United States for its fundamental security. (Our bilateral agreement with Iran of 1959 states that we will take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, in accordance with our Constitution, and as may be mutually agreed upon, to assist Iran against aggression.)
III. Iran’s Foreign and Domestic Situation
Iran has in recent years played an increasingly active role in regional affairs. The Shah has become concerned about possible radical Arab penetration, perhaps with Soviet collusion into the Persian Gulf following the withdrawal of British forces in 1971. He has therefore moved to protect Iran’s Gulf life-line and rich southern oil resources through a carrot-and-stick policy toward Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. Iran’s relations with Turkey and Pakistan are good, and relations with Afghanistan have been improving. While, as a Moslem country, Iran’s public stance on Arab-Israeli matters is generally pro-Arab, Iran’s distaste for radical Arabism as sponsored by Nasser has led to the development of close, although informal, relations with, Israel.
Iran’s internal political situation is stable, with the Shah in firm control and with any potential opposition quieted by the success of the regime’s economic development and social reform programs and by the appeal of the Shah’s nationalistic foreign policy. Economic growth, based primarily on burgeoning oil revenues but also on better use of Iran’s well-trained younger generation, has been proceeding rapidly, with annual rates of GNP growth approximating 9 per cent in recent years.
IV. U.S. Objectives
The objectives of our Iranian policy are:
– To support an independent, self-reliant Iran.
– To maintain our close ties with Iran, especially with the Shah.
– To assure Iranian vigilance against Soviet long-term aims.
– To maintain our communications and intelligence facilities and overflight privileges in Iran.
– To influence Iran to promote stability in the Middle East.
– To maintain western access to Iranian oil, protect and promote American investment in Iran, and obtain for the U.S. the largest possible share of the growing Iranian market.
V. U.S. Strategy
To achieve our objectives, we have devised a political, military and economic strategy.
a. Political
In our dealings with Iran we respect Iran’s independence and welcome its self-reliance while seeking-to maintain our special security relationship. We use all possible opportunities, for example in connection with our military credit program, to urge upon the Shah and Iranian government leaders the importance of concentrating financial and manpower resources on economic development. We encourage good relations with Saudi Arabia and the full Sheikhdoms in the interest of maintaining stability and of keeping out forces bent on making trouble. While expressing understanding of the economic benefits Iran reaps from its improved relations with the USSR, we remind the Iranians of low-term Soviet objectives and encourage vigilance. Of special importance since the ending of our AID program in order to promote close ties between us are programs involving exchanges of persons between our two countries, whether under public (Peace Corps, Fulbright program) or private auspices, and programs of cooperation in scientific and other areas where Iran is in need of advanced technological or management assistance.

b. Military
The key to our relations with the Shah and his regime is our assistance for the modernization of Iran’s armed’ forces. Beginning in FY 1970, except for training and MAAG support, all of this assistance will be in the form of credits. The Shah’s demands for military equipment from us are insistent and large, and have increased since theg annoncement of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. We have to examine these requests carefully, from the standpoint of their effect on area stability and on Iran’s economic development, but it is also clear that unless we remain Iran’s principal military supplier our interests in Iran, including our ability to maintain our own strategic interests there and to influence the Shah in the direction of constructive foreign and domestic policies, will be seriously weakened.
C. Economic
Although our grant economic aid has ended, we continue to do all we can to encourage Iran’s economic growth and a balanced allocation of resources between military and economic. Our military credit program gives us our best opportunity to pursue these goals, but others also exist, including private American resources. Of vital importance to Iran’s development is the maintenance of constructive relations between Iran and the major oil companies operating there. Our diplomatic efforts are aimed at preserving the good relations that now exist: Finally, our own commercial interests are promoted through the Export-Import Bank, private American-investment, trade fairs and the like which assist the export of American products to Iran.
https://archive.li/https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e4/64774.htm%23

NOTES FOR BLOG POST:
[1] “These Three Billionaires Paved Way For Trump’s Iran Deal Withdrawal
GOP megadonors Sheldon Adelson, Bernard Marcus, and Paul Singer are getting exactly what paid for when they threw their financial weight behind Trump” By Eli Clifton, May 9, 2018 https://fpif.org/these-three-billionaires-paved-way-for-trumps-iran-deal-withdrawal/
[2] https://en.radiofarda.com/a/timeline-iran-s-nuclear-program-and-sanctions/29583330.html
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushang_Ansary
[4] “Trump’s fundraisers see no chance of hitting $1 billion“, by Alex Isenstadt, June 8, 2016, Politico https://archive.li/Ig5Pw
[5] “Revealed: Members of the Trump $1 million inaugural club“, By Megan R. Wilson, 04/19/17, The Hill. https://archive.li/MhsuV
[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushang_Ansary
See references in the Wikipedia article.
[7] “Corruption in Iran“, By Jonathan C. R and al November 19, 1978, Washington Post: https://archive.li/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/11/19/corruption-in-iran/2d168c93-2453-4bf2-8878-ed0d255a8496/
[8] “ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN
A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS, SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES“, NOVEMBER 19,1979 https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/96th%20Congress/Economic%20Consequences%20of%20the%20Revolution%20in%20Iran%20(968).pdf