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India signing the CSC (Convention on Supplementary Compensation) was pushed for by the US-India Business Council when Indo-American Richard Verma was their lobbyist. It finally was ratified a little over a year after Verma became US Ambassador to India. The CSC went into force initially with Japan signing on and then India. The CSC is supposed to make the US liable for picking up part of the cost of a nuclear disaster in member countries. And, to a lesser extent, India and Japan liable for US accidents. It is supposed to be based on installed capacity so that the US and Japan would pay the most, above a base amount, in the event of a nuclear disaster in any member country. The CSC is an extremely bad deal for India, since they apparently lost the right to sue, and may be a bad deal for America. It is a bad deal for honest vendors. It is a bad deal for Japan-except for their nuclear and uranium vendors, and is a bad deal for the smaller countries who have signed onto this shoddy deal (e.g. Morocco, Romania, UAE, Argentina). The only beneficiaries of this Convention are those selling defective nuclear equipment(includes fuel), as Russian government owned Rosatom and/or its affiliate companies, have apparently done in India at Koodankulam. Since Russia and France are not members of the CSC they would apparently pay nothing for disasters caused by their defective equipment (Russia’s Rosatom and France’s Areva are both government owned, but are operating internationally as though they were private corporations). https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2016/12/31/nuclear-convention-on-supplementary-compensation-csc-does-not-protect-people-in-india-or-elsewhere/
https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2015/01/28/westinghouse-is-japanese-toshiba-not-american-for-16-years. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/110th_United_States_Congress After Trump and Pence are removed from office via impeachment or elections, there needs to be an investigation into this crime. Both Bush-Cheney and the democratic Congress, at the time, appear to be guilty.

For those who forgot: “During the Cold War, India and the Soviet Union (USSR) enjoyed a strong strategic, military, economic and diplomatic relationship. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited the close relationship with India, even as India improved its relations with the West after the end of the Cold War… the Indo-Russian strategic partnership has been built on five major components: politics, defence, civil nuclear energy, anti-terrorism co-operationand space….” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India–Russia_relations


Koodankulam Nuclear Power Protest – PMANE, – Dianuke.org

Atomstroyexport (ASE), discussed in the press release, is part of Russian State owned Rosatom.

Via Dianuke.org:
“OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL
New Delhi; 27.12.17

Press Release

CAG’s Performance Audit Report on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, Units I & II tabled in Parliament

Report highlights a number of deficiencies in the execution and commissioning of Units I & II of the Project

The report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP), Units I & II (38 of 2017) was laid in Parliament today. This Report on KKNPP for the year ending March 2017 highlights a number of deficiencies in the execution and commissioning of Units I & II of KKNPP such as avoidable payment of interest on borrowings, non-transparency in availing loans, lapses in tariff fixation process, extending undue benefits to overseas collaborating partner, non assessment of required manpower with consequent avoidable expenditure, inadequate monitoring and start of commercial operation before getting the required licence to operate from the competent authority. The audit was conducted to assess whether Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) exercised prudent financial management in the construction/commissioning of Units I & II and implemented the project in an efficient manner.

Audit Findings

The schedule date of completion was postponed from 30 October 2007 to 31 December 2011 for Unit I and from 30 October 2008 to 31 December 2012 for Unit II, inert-alia, due to delayed completion of different activities, of which many were attributable to the M/s Atomstroyexport (ASE), a company responsible for undertaking the Russian scope of work. However, there was no revision of schedule of repayment of the Russian credit. This resulted in start of repayment of Russian credit, before revenue generation, causing an additional interest burden on NPCIL to the tune of ₹ 449.92 crore.

(Para 2.1)

NPCIL had to resort to external borrowings at a higher interest rate due to non-provisioning for erection reserve supply contracts while availing Russian credit, which was available at a cheaper rate. This resulted in additional interest cost amounting to ₹76.02 crore.

(Para 2.2)

NPCIL availed term loan of ₹ 1,000 crore from HDFC Bank Limited in violation of CVC’s guidelines on tendering.

(Para 2.4)

NPCIL, while fixing tariff for power, did not consider two components, i.e., ‘interest on foreign debt’ and ‘interest on domestic borrowings’, though these were actually incurred and paid. This resulted in short realisation of revenue to the tune of ₹ 90.63 crore during pre-commercialisation period.

(Para 3.1)

Unit I of KKNPP was shut down from 24 June 2015 to 31 January 2016 for 222 days as against the planned period of 60 days. This was due to decision of NPCIL to shut down the plant and execute the refuelling work on its own without evaluating its technical competency. The extended shutdown resulted in revenue loss of ₹ 947.99 crore to the NPCIL.

(Para 3.4)

Unit I and Unit II of KKNPP started commercial operation after a delay of 86 months and 101 months respectively. The delays were primarily due to shifting of work from Russian scope to Indian scope; in execution of work and in submission of working documents/supply of equipment/materials by ASE; delays due to design changes; erection delays and additional works. The delay in completion also resulted in cost overruns. NPCIL did not initiate any claim for recovery of additional expenses of ₹264.79 crore which were caused due to delayed completion of works by ASE.

(Paras 4.1.1 and 4.1.2)

As against the original value of USD 29 million (₹ 131.66 crore), NPCIL incurred an amount of USD 50.91 million (₹ 231.13 crore) for supply of same equipment in a rearranged contract leading to extra expenditure of ₹ 99.47 crore.

(Para 4.2.1)

NPCIL neither assessed the extra payments/loss due to non supply/defective supply of materials by ASE nor did it initiate any action for recovery/adjustments for the same.

(Para 4.2.4)

NPCIL did not raise/pursue claims for liquidated damages worth ₹ 463.08 crore for ASE even though during the same time, it was borrowing funds and paying interest to discharge debt obligations including from ASE.

(Para 4.2.5 (a))

The work of erection and commissioning of Nuclear Steam Supply and Turbo Generator was shifted from the Russian scope to the Indian Scope for achieving the stated purpose of optimisation of manpower cost by way of reduction in man-months of Russian specialist for supervision at the site. This was done without any cost-benefit analysis, which not only resulted in delays in completion of the project but also ended up in NPCIL incurring an extra expenditure of ₹ 706.87 crore for the work.

(Para 4.3.1)

NPCIL compensated a sea route transporter by reimbursing wharfage charges and additional handling charges amounting to ₹ 7.08 crore, which was unjustified as the terms of contract provided for such charges to be incurred by transporter himself.

(Para 4.3.2 (b))

NPCIL did not ensure reasonability of the rates of third party supplies {worth USD 191 million (₹ 899.95 crore)}, made by ASE, for the plant. Further, an amount of USD 19 million (₹ 92.04 crore) towards 10 per cent interest free advance was paid by NPCIL to ASE for the third country supplies, without ascertaining the existence of similar provisions in the sub-contracts entered by ASE with third country suppliers.

(Para 4.4.1 and 4.4.2)

NPCIL, on 31 December 2014, declared commercial operation of the Unit I of KKNPP which was six months before receiving the license from AERB for regular operation of the plant.

(Para 4.6)

Recommendations

In all cases of rescheduling of commissioning dates, the repayment schedule for Russian credit may also be revised accordingly.

Loans from banks may be availed in a transparent and documented manner following the extant rules and regulations.

NPCIL should have effective monitoring/feedback mechanism to monitor issues like long pending insurance claims.

All cases of infirm tariff fixation may be processed by NPCIL according to prefixed criteria to avoid discretionary adhocism in decision making for the same.

For all future planned shutdowns NPCIL may do a competency analysis by mapping with a structured breakdown analysis, to take timely decision, if required, for engaging external consultants to avoid prolonged shutdown and consequential revenue loss.

Future delays should be avoided by sequencing the supplies with the various stages of production.

Interest of NPCIL should be protected in all contract renegotiations by ascertaining the quantitative benefits flowing out of such negotiations.

NPCIL should take timely action for recovery/ adjustment for non/defective supply of material by ASE.

Liquidated damages should be claimed in an accurate and timely fashion.

Cost benefit analysis should be invariably conducted before agreeing to a shift in scope of work from Russian side to Indian side and vice versa.

Work orders should not be awarded on a single tender basis unless they qualify for the same as per NPCIL manual and CVC guidelines.

NPCIL should award work to existing contractors after proper rate analysis to obtain competitive rates.

Agreements for execution of work order should invariably be entered into by NPCIL with the contractor before award of the contracts.

NPCIL should prepare schedule of rates, at least, for the works of routine nature like construction of pump house, tunnel, chlorination plant etc. with a view to have better estimation of rates for awarding contracts.

With regard to the contracts for supply of equipment by third country, NPCIL should consider participating in joint evaluation of bids, with a view to ensure price reasonability of the contract(s). CC-BY-NC: http://www.dianuke.org/press-release-cag-audit-key-findings-report-deficiencies-koodankulam-nuclear-plant (Emphasis our own.)

“Atomstroyexport (Russian: Атомстройэкспорт) is the Russian Federation’s nuclear power equipment and service exporter. It belongs to Atomenergoprom holding with 49.8% of shares owned by Gazprombank. The activities of Atomstroyexport are financially supported by the Russian government. The CEO of Atomstroyexport is Sergei Shmatko…“. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomenergomash
“Atomenergoprom (Atomic Energy Power Corporation, AEP, Russian: AO Атомэнергопром) is a 100% state-owned holding company that unifies the Russian civil nuclear industry. It is a part of the Rosatom State corporation…. Atomenergoprom was created by a Presidential Decree signed by Vladimir Putin on 27 April 2007, following the adoption of a new law by the Russian Parliament on 19 January 2007,…. Atomenergoprom includes nuclear power plant operator Energoatom, nuclear fuel producer and supplier TVEL, uranium traderTekhsnabexport (Tenex), nuclear facilities constructor Atomenergomash, international nuclear construction and project management concern Atomstroyexport, and uranium mining company ARMZ Uranium Holding Co. (Atomredmetzoloto).[3][4]….” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomenergoprom

While involving some private investment, Gazprombank appears to still be Russian government controlled through various government controlled entities