cancer, Chernobyl, clean water, dangers of nuclear, environment, France, ionizing radiation, Mayak, no safe dose, NRC, nuclear, nuclear accident, nuclear disaster, nuclear energy, nuclear fuel reprocessing, nuclear industry, nuclear power, nuclear reactors, nuclear safety, nuclear waste, nuclear weapons, Putin, radioactive waste, risk management, Rosatom, Russia, Russian nuclear industry, Ruthenium 106, Ruthenium oxides, Spent Nuclear Fuel, Toxic, transition metals, UK, Urals, US NRC, USA, USSR
The multiple low pressure systems-former hurricanes in the north Atlantic, at the end of September, appear to guarantee that radioactive materials from an accident at the nuclear facilities of Sellafield UK or the Hague, France would have been sucked toward-into the low pressure systems to the west-northwest, in this time period, rather than going to the south, south-east. The offshore systems led to strong easterly winds blowing from Russia. Furthermore, Russia first said that they had picked up no Ruthenium 106, except in the north (St. Petersburg), only to later admit that there was more. Additionally, one cannot preclude that there was more than ruthenium 106 and either it wasn’t picked up in Europe or that Europe is not admitting to it. The Iodine 131 from earlier in the year appeared to follow a similar pattern and could be from the same source – Russia. With good weather maps and adequate data it should be fairly easy to pin-point the source, which France says it has done for the ruthenium. Although they can’t be trusted, they are probably right. There was an incident in Sweden at Studsvik rated as an INES 2 accident, however. It occurred on September 21st. The ruthenium cloud fallout was first noted on the 25th of September.
“The mysterious radioactive cloud—why the ruthenium-106 story matters Blogpost by Jan Haverkamp, Andrey Allakhverdov – 27 November, 2017 at 0:49
A week ago, the Russian meteorological service, Roshydromet, reacted to a month-long standing request for information from Greenpeace. It triggered extraordinary interest among journalists world-wide in a rather unknown bit of nuclear physics: the radioactive substance ruthenium-106 .
For weeks, two Russian state-run bodies, Rosatom and Roshydromet, made statements negating or misinterpreting each other’s information and the data coming from French and German sources. The International Atomic Energy Agency – the UN body in which all nuclear states are supposed to cooperate – did not give any clarity, and only a Russian energy propaganda site leaked what looks like the IAEA’s measurement data . The Russian disinformation services were working overtime over social and even official media, making denial statements and sometimes pointing the finger to France and the Ukraine. In other words, there is no reliable information on where the cloud of this rare man-made radioactive substance came from.
The only thing that is clear, is that at its source there must have been a lot of it – sufficient,according to the French nuclear research institute IRSN , to activate precautionary measures for some kilometres around. The scary thing is that we still don’t know what caused it. Speculation abounds: medical waste burned in an incinerator? Or an incident in the recently started new plant in the nuclear reprocessing facility, Mayak, or like in 2001 in a similar installation in France?  We know it was no satellite and no nuclear power plant.
The Russian nuclear giant Rosatom has a legacy of denying accidents at nuclear facilities and radiation pollution: The explosion at Mayak (also known as the Kyshtym disaster) in 1957 andcontinuous contamination of the area  in the South Urals; the Chernobyl catastrophe that was denied in the first days, and the effects of which last until today; the 1993 explosion at the Siberian Chemical Combine  where, among other isotopes, the same ruthenium-106 was released into the atmosphere and about 2000 people were contaminated. The emergency situation in 2007 at Mayak resulted in the radioactive contamination of water; and many other incidents. In these cases, the event was immediately denied, then later reluctantly admitted after denial had become impossible.
Earlier this year, we saw similar denial and disinformation  when particulate Iodine-131 was measured all over Europe and IRSN could only conclude the source was “likely situated in Eastern Europe”.
Rosatom is building, or is planning to build, nuclear power plants in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. It boasts a portfolio worth some $133 billion. We need full transparency, immediate cooperation with regulatory authorities, the IAEA, international partners and competitors, whistleblower protection, and attention and care for the potential victims.
Rosatom has done nothing to demonstrate it is a responsible actor. No early and constructive publication of measurement data, no constructive analysis of what the source could be. Only denial, diversion of attention, and shooting at the messenger.
In order to get more clarity, Greenpeace saw no other possibility than to request an investigation from the public prosecutor. The fact that the source of this ruthenium-106 emission remains a mystery is a reason for concern in itself. But the fact that Rosatom, one of the largest nuclear operators in the world, reacts as it did makes it really scary.
Jan Haverkamp is nuclear expert consultant at Greenpeace Central and Eastern Europe. Andrey Allakhverdov is press secretary of the Greenpeace CEE nuclear project.
Tags nuclear, rosatom, ruthenium-106, radioactive, russia, mayak
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/radioactive-cloud-ruthenium-106/blog/60775 (Emphasis our own.)
 For the link given by Greenpeace please go via the greenpeace link above, as we don’t want to link to the Russian site. Bellona has uploaded this: http://network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/4/2017/10/Summary_of_Ru-106_measurements_in_Europe_at_2017-10-13_at_1900_UTC_UTC_Technical_Attachment-2.pdf
and this: http://network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/4/2017/10/Summary_of_Ru-106_measurements_in_Europe_at_2017-10-13_at_1900_UTC.pdf