Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

America’s pre-rotted “new” nuclear reactor has been listed by the US NRC as having power status of zero percent for several days. Commercial operation for Watts Bar Unit 2 lasted for only four days or less. While the media lauded this antiquated structure as a new nuclear reactor going online, they haven’t bothered to notice that it’s offline. The US NRC hasn’t bothered to explain why it’s at 0% power output. To drop from 100% to 0% suggests that there was an urgent SCRAM. Watts Bar Unit 2 even had a fire at the end of August. If people are smart they will indeed scram as far away from this antiquated nuclear reactor as possible – the origin of the word according to the NRC historian. Nuclear reactors are not made to just turn off and on, either, because it adds additional stresses to materials.

Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 2 was 80% complete 31 years ago! It is visibly old. Look at the picture!
Watts Bar Nuclear Cooling Towers
Furthermore, the old parts were apparently also substandard! Everyone should be shuddering about attempts to operate this old pre-rotted and defective nuclear reactor. With stupidity and corruption rife, Americans can simply laugh as they may well die from this sick joke. It sounds like some of the nuclear reactor start-ups in India. Even the building itself is now corrupted, i.e. old term for rotten.

The operating status of Watts Bar Unit 2 nuclear reactor has been reported at 0% since October 23rd. It officially went into commercial operations on October 19th and remained at 100% for around FOUR DAYS.
Watts Bar Oct. 25 2016 0%
Google search showing that it is 0%

Watts Bar Unit 2 reportedly operated at 100% from October 3rd to 22nd, less than 3 weeks. On October 2nd it was at 84%; on October 1st at 54%; on September 28, 29, 30 it was at 100%; September 27th at 70%; September 26th at 25%.

From August 31st, subsequent to a fire on the night of the 30th, until September 22nd Watts Bar Unit 2 was at 0% – ZERO PERCENT.

365 Days of Reactor status in alphabetical order: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/PowerReactorStatusForLast365Days.txt

Thus, since Watts Bar Unit 2 went commercial it ran four days, maybe slightly less; it ran at 100% from October 3rd to 23rd or less than 3 weeks. It was at 100% for three days in September before power was reduced for a couple of days either due to concerns or powering up from a scram.

The Watts Bar reactors are antiquated, ice-condenser designs from the 1960’s. Construction started over 40 years ago. It is the height of public relations over-reach to call Unit 2 a “new” reactor. It is not the first new reactor of the 21 st century; it is the last old reactor of the 20th century.

The very design itself compromises public safety in favor of lower construction cost. The idea of surrounding the reactor core with baskets of ice to allow smaller, weaker, cheaper containment… is a relic of early nuclear reactor design. Ice condenser reactors have been plagued with many problems over the years at the nine operating units in the U.S. Watts Bar Unit 2 is being licensed under the old 10 CFR Part 50 rules, not the Part 51 and 52 rules for new reactors.” points out Don Safer of the Tennessee Environmental Council, Watts Bar 2 NRC Briefing Letter http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2014/safer-10-30-2014-meeting.pdf

Unit 2 was 80% complete when construction on both units was stopped in the 1980s https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watts_Bar_Nuclear_Generating_Station#Unit_2_construction_project

In 1985, construction quality issues at its plants caused TVA to stop work at both Watts Bar Units.” https://web.archive.org/web/20160415214335/http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2014/10/21/watts-bar-making-history-in-yet-another-century/

TVA is US government owned so it should do better, not worse than others. The TVA is the US equivalent to France’s EDF-AREVA and Russia’s Rosatom, but praise God, unlike France and Russia, at least it doesn’t export its defective nuclear reactors!

At Watts Bar Unit 2 (and other TVA reactors): https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2016/10/23/iranian-american-vp-of-tva-watts-bar-nuclear-unit-2-during-construction-guilty-of-illegally-sending-money-to-iran-discriminating-against-nuclear-whistleblower-watts-bar-makes-tritium-for-us-nucl/

At TVA’s Brown’s Ferry: https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2016/10/23/iranian-american-vp-of-tva-watts-bar-nuclear-unit-2-during-construction-guilty-of-illegally-sending-money-to-iran-discriminating-against-nuclear-whistleblower-watts-bar-makes-tritium-for-us-nucl/

The TVA Notes the commercial operation of Watts Bar Unit 2, but fails to tell us why it is suddenly offline. Old age? Defective nuclear parts? Old and defective nuclear parts?
OCTOBER 19, 2016—The nation’s first new nuclear generation in 20 years has officially entered commercial operation after the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar Unit 2 successfully completed an extensive series of power ascension tests and reliably operated at full power for more than three weeks“. https://www.tva.com/Newsroom/Watts-Bar-2-Project

This pair of nuclear reactors has a unique distinction. Back in 1996, Watts Bar Unit 1 was the last reactor completed in the United States, at a hefty $6.8 billion… The Tennessee Valley Authority now tallies the cost of completing Watts Bar 2 to be about $4.4 billion. Add the $1.7 billion sunk into the project before 1985 and Watts Bar 2 will cost about $6.1 billion. The combined Watts Bar project cost of almost $13 billion is nearly 16 times the original projection, not including the interest on the construction debt.” http://thebulletin.org/watts-bar-unit-2-last-old-reactor-20th-century-cautionary-tale8783

This fiasco called Watts Bar 2 is part of the US nuclear weapons complex:
Tritium is a heavy isotope of hydrogen and a key component of nuclear weapons, but it decays radioactively at the rate of 5.5 percent each year and must be replenished continually. This is accomplished by recycling tritium from existing warheads and by extracting tritium from target rods irradiated in nuclear reactors that are operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Recycled and extracted gases are purified to produce tritium that is suitable for usehttp://www.srs.gov/general/news/factsheets/tf.pdf

TVA was in a huge rush with Watts Bar and demanded an exemption because it had to go online in 1978!
The present schedule for constructing the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is predicated on beginning construction in October 1972. This schedule is extremely tight and failure to begin construction in October casts serious doubts on TVA’s ability to meet its load commitments in the 1977-78 period. Since it is doubtful that a construction permit will be granted before February or March 1973 at the earliest, TVA must be granted an exemption for site preparation activities if the schedule is to be maintained.” http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0734/ML073440321.pdfTENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Units 1 and 2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Rhea County, Tennessee (Docket Nos. 0-6 0 and 50-391)

The plant, construction of which began in 1973, has two Westinghouse pressurized water reactor units: Unit 1, completed in 1996,…https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watts_Bar_Nuclear_Generating_Station

Watts Bar Tripping Out When Connected to Grid in June 2016

June 2016: “KNOXVILLE, Tenn. – The Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar nuclear Unit 2 generated electricity onto its power grid for the first time on Friday, June 3.
https://www.tva.gov/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Watts-Bar-Unit-2-Produces-Electricity-for-the-First-Time

Two days later: “REACTOR TRIP AND ECCS ACTUATION CAUSED BY TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE FAILURE
“On June 5, 2016 at 1227 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in MODE 1 at approximately 12.5% power when a safety injection actuation occurred, followed by an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) trip. Preliminary data suggests that the #1 high pressure turbine governor valve failed open causing a steam header pressure rate of decrease safety injection [SI] actuation signal… The MSIVs are shut with the steam generators (SG) discharging steam using the atmospheric dump valves. There is no primary to secondary leakage. Motor driven AFW pumps are running to maintain SG levels. RCS pressure remained above ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) discharge pressure.” http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160606en.html

15 Days Later It Tripped Again
On June 20, 2016 at 1540 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor tripped due to [reaching the] automatic Lo-Lo steam generator trip [setpoint] on [the] #4 steam generator. Concurrent with the reactor trip the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed… The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and main steam dump systems…. “The cause is currently under investigation…http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160621en.html

Even before it connected to the grid:
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN, Unit: [1] [2],
“SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION – LOSS OF 1 B-B ELECTRICAL BUSS
“On May 17, 2016, at 1630 hours while restoring from a plant modification related to new ‘loss of phase’ circuitry, the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss de-energized resulting in a loss of voltage on the buss. The loss of voltage was caused by the loss of voltage relays that separated offsite power from the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss. At the time, the 1 B-B emergency diesel generator was removed from service for planned maintenance.
“In response to the loss of power on the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss, the operators entered abnormal operating instruction, AOI 43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, and started emergency diesel generators 1 A-A, 2 A-A, and 2 B-B. All equipment operated properly. The emergency diesel generators were not required to be paralleled to the boards.
“Offsite power was restored to the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss at 1802 hours on May 17, 2016. This condition did not result in any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), ‘Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'”
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160518en.html

The event was listed as a hot shutdown and yet it was at 0% power for a long time in the run up to it, according to this: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/PowerReactorStatusForLast365Days.txt

August 30th Fire. Local Fire departments, probably volunteers, called to help:
NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT – FIRE IN A MAIN BANK TRANSFORMER

A fault occurred on the unit 2 “B” main bank transformer resulting in an oil fire. The main turbine tripped resulting in a reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the main condenser and feeding steam generators with auxiliary feedwater. Electrical power is through the normal shutdown electrical lineup.

Offsite assistance was requested from the county and off duty fire brigade members.

At 2228, the fire was reported as out. Spray is continuing and a reflash watch is being set.

Unit 1 continued to operate at 100% power throughout the event.

Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (E-mail) and Nuclear SSA (E-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 2352 EDT ON 08/30/2016 FROM MICHAEL BOTTORFF TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

“On August 30, 2016, at 2110 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor tripped due to an electrical fault affecting the 2B Main Bank Transformer, resulting in a fire in the transformer.

“Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

“All Control and Shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and main steam dump systems. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.

“The fire was out at 2230 EDT. The cause of the fire is currently under investigation.

“The fire was reported at 2149 EDT. Local Fire Departments responded to the site as requested.

“The reactor trip and system actuation is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).

“There was no effect on WBN Unit 1.

“The NOUE was exited at 2342.

“The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.”

The Licensee notified the State of Tennessee.

Notified the R2DO (Bartley), IRD MOC (Stapleton), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (E-mail) and Nuclear SSA (E-mail).” http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160621en.html

WBN Units 1 and 2 have a unique licensing history and regulatory framework. TVA received a construction permit for each unit in 1973 under 10 CFR Part 50. Construction proceeded until 1985, when WBN Unit 1 was thought to be essentially complete and nearly ready to receive an operating license (OL), as documented in NUREG-0847, “Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,” through Supplement 4.

As a consequence of the identification of a large number of deficiencies shortly before the WBN Unit 1 license was expected to be issued, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a letter to TVA on September 17, 1985, requesting information under 10 CFR 50.54(f), on TVA’s plans to address the deficiencies for its operating and construction activities at Watts Bar and TVA’s other nuclear facilities. http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactors/wb/watts-bar/history.html Unit 2 was 80% complete in the 80s. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watts_Bar_Nuclear_Generating_Station#Unit_2_construction_project

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Faulty Overcurrent Trip Delay Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems.
https://ntrl.ntis.gov/NTRL/dashboard/searchResults/titleDetail/DKT5039037.xhtml
http://www.ntis.gov/Search/Home/titleDetail/?abbr=DKT5039037

To resolve the OPC design vulnerability at Watts Bar 2, staff requests that TVA provide design features and analyses information in the Final Safety Analysis Report to automatically detect and alarm in the main control room for OPC with and without a high impedance ground condition including two open phase condition on the high voltage side of a transformer connecting a credited GDC-17 offsite power circuit to the transmission system. For OPC, automatic detection and actuation circuits will transfer loads required to mitigate postulated accidents to an alternate power source and ensure that safety functions are preserved, as required by the current licensing bases. The OPC should be sensitive enough to identify an open phase condition under all operating electrical system configurations and loading conditions for which they are required to be operable and. should minimize misoperation, maloperation, and spurious actuation. In addition, the staff requests TVA to address the limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements that must be added to the plant Technical Specifications to meet the provisions of 10CFR50.36 (c) (2) and c(3).http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1405/ML14059A158.pdf

Longer excerpt from the US NRC history of Watts Bar:
WBN Units 1 and 2 have a unique licensing history and regulatory framework. TVA received a construction permit for each unit in 1973 under 10 CFR Part 50. Construction proceeded until 1985, when WBN Unit 1 was thought to be essentially complete and nearly ready to receive an operating license (OL), as documented in NUREG-0847, “Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,” through Supplement 4.

As a consequence of the identification of a large number of deficiencies shortly before the WBN Unit 1 license was expected to be issued, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a letter to TVA on September 17, 1985, requesting information under 10 CFR 50.54(f), on TVA’s plans to address the deficiencies for its operating and construction activities at Watts Bar and TVA’s other nuclear facilities. In response to this letter, TVA developed a Nuclear Performance Plan (NPP) to address corporate and site-specific issues, establishing programs to address a wide variety of material, design, and programmatic deficiencies. WBN Unit 2 construction was suspended at about that time, with major structures in place and equipment such as reactor coolant system piping installed. On October 13, 1999, TVA filed a request for extension of the completion date for Unit 2, and by letter dated July 14, 2000, TVA informed the NRC that WBN Unit 2 meets the NRC’s definition for deferred nuclear plant units as described in the Commission’s Policy Statement on Deferred Plants, 52 FR 38077 (Oct. 14, 1987). On October 24, 2000, the NRC issued an order extending the Unit 2 construction permit to December 31, 2010….
Because of the complexity of the rework activities under the NPP, the NRC implemented a “reconstitution” of the construction inspection program to verify that construction-related inspections conducted after 1985 met the requirements of the IMC 2512 program. The results of this program were published in NUREG-1528, “Reconstitution of the Manual Chapter 2512 Construction Inspection Program for Watts Bar Unit 1.” Simultaneously, the staff had completed a substantial number of IMC 2512 inspections for WBN Unit 2, as well; however, TVA suspended WBN Unit 2 construction before the inspection program was completed, and the staff then suspended its licensing and inspection activities…
The NRC staff reviewed components of the NPP for WBN Unit 1 and, as documented in NUREG-1232, Volume 4, “Safety Evaluation Report on Tennessee Valley Authority: Watts Bar Nuclear Performance Plan, Watts Bar Unit 1” (January 1990), the staff endorsed the general approaches of various corrective actions. The staff determined that when implemented thoroughly, the proposed corrective actions should address the identified deficiencies for Unit 1; however, no conclusions were stated for WBN Unit 2….
TVA addressed WBN Unit 1 construction quality issues as part of the implementation of its NPP. Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2512, “Light Water Reactor Inspection Program – Construction Phase,” was used to ensure that WBN Unit 1 was constructed in accordance with NRC-approved design and construction standards. In 1985, the NRC had completed its initial IMC 2512 inspection program for the construction of WBN Unit 1. However, the initial WBN inspection program was found to have some weaknesses, which were identified and corrected after the construction inspection program was completed for Unit 1, but before the facility was licensed. Because of the complexity of the rework activities under the NPP, the NRC implemented a “reconstitution” of the construction inspection program to verify that construction-related inspections conducted after 1985 met the requirements of the IMC 2512 program. The results of this program were published in NUREG-1528, “Reconstitution of the Manual Chapter 2512 Construction Inspection Program for Watts Bar Unit 1.” Simultaneously, the staff had completed a substantial number of IMC 2512 inspections for WBN Unit 2, as well; however, TVA suspended WBN Unit 2 construction before the inspection program was completed, and the staff then suspended its licensing and inspection activities.
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactors/wb/watts-bar/history.html

TVA suspended construction of Watts Bar Unit 2 in 1985. In 2007, TVA informed NRC of its plan to resume construction of Watts Bar Unit 2.http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactors/wb/watts-bar.html

Watts Bar permitted to leave open phase condition unrectified until in 2017
http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1416/ML14163A606.pdf

From a 2008 Watts Bar violation:
c. The installation plans for a 240-volt, electrical circuit connecting a non-Class 1E circuit with a Class 1E circuit called for the use of 10-gauge wire. The inspector noted that the installation had been done using 8-gauge wire.

The violation: Failure to follow procedures, plans, and/or drawings for installation of a Class 1E electrical circuit

Minor because: The use of 8-gauge wire does not degrade the circuit, and can be accepted as-is.

Not minor if: The applicant’s program for connections to Class 1E electrical circuits does not allow any deviations from plans and/or drawings, or the lowered resistance provided by the 8-gauge wire would cause problems with balancing or control of the circuit and must be re-worked…
APPENDIX C Minor Violations and Findings Issue Date: 02/15/08 C-4, C-5, 2517 NRC INSPECTION MANUAL IRIB MANUAL CHAPTER 2517 WATTS BAR UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION PROGRAM http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0733/ML073330082.pdf

This was Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw Land
The area surrounding Watts Bar was inhabited by the Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw Native American tribes during the late 18th century. There are two competing theories as to Watts Bar’s namesake. The first comes from some of the descendants of Meigs County’s original settlers. They claim that the area was named from a Native American named Wattsi and that the Watts Creek was formerly known as Wattsi Creek. The second theory comes from historical records showing that the territory surrounding Watts Bar during the latter part of the 18th century belonged to John Watts, a Choctaw chief, famous for his ability as a warrior and leader. No direct connection has been found linking his name with Watts Bar, leaving this just a theory. https://www.tva.gov/Energy/Our-Power-System/Nuclear/Watts-Bar-Nuclear-Plant

TVA: About the August 30th Fire at Watts Bar

a transformer fire in an onsite switchyard at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant on Tuesday night, August 30. The fire was initially reported at approx. 9:11 pm EDT and was fully extinguished in a little over one hour…  After the fire was reported, an Unusual Event—the least severe of four emergency classifications—was declared at 9:20 pm EDT. After operators confirmed the fire was extinguished and all plant systems were in a safe, stable condition, the site exited the Unusual Event classification at 11:42 pm EDT.

The transformer is located in an exterior switchyard. When it failed, Watts Bar Unit 2 was automatically taken offline as designed, and all systems operated as expected… Watts Bar Unit 1 was unaffected and remains online.

As a precaution, plant personnel requested assistance from three local fire departments. We greatly appreciate their rapid and professional response, although onsite personnel were able to successfully extinguish the fire before the additional assistance became necessary.

Our current focus remains on ensuring the safety of the public and our employees as we work to determine the cause of the fire and make necessary repairs to allow Unit 2 to resume its power ascension testing.” https://www.tva.gov/Newsroom/safetytrainingextinguishfire

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION – LOSS OF 1 B-B ELECTRICAL BUSS
“On May 17, 2016, at 1630 hours while restoring from a plant modification related to new ‘loss of phase’ circuitry, the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss de-energized resulting in a loss of voltage on the buss. The loss of voltage was caused by the loss of voltage relays that separated offsite power from the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss. At the time, the 1 B-B emergency diesel generator was removed from service for planned maintenance.

“In response to the loss of power on the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss, the operators entered abnormal operating instruction, AOI 43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, and started emergency diesel generators 1 A-A, 2 A-A, and 2 B-B. All equipment operated properly. The emergency diesel generators were not required to be paralleled to the boards.

“Offsite power was restored to the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss at 1802 hours on May 17, 2016. This condition did not result in any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), ‘Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'”
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160518en.html

REACTOR TRIP AND ECCS ACTUATION CAUSED BY TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE FAILURE
“On June 5, 2016 at 1227 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in MODE 1 at approximately 12.5% power when a safety injection actuation occurred, followed by an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) trip. Preliminary data suggests that the #1 high pressure turbine governor valve failed open causing a steam header pressure rate of decrease safety injection [SI] actuation signal. As designed, the safety injection actuation caused both trains of the shared Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) to align to Unit 2, requiring WBN Unit 1 to enter Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.0.3 at 1227 [EDT]. Also as designed, Unit 1 annulus pressure momentarily increased, causing operation personnel to enter LCO 3.6.15 Condition B at 1240 [EDT]. At 1242 [EDT], after annulus pressure normalized, operations personnel exited LCO 3.6.15. At 1245 [EDT], Operations personnel secured safety injection and Unit 2 was stabilized in MODE 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. By 1349 [EDT], Unit 1 Operations personnel had restored both trains of EGTS to standby readiness, and exited TS 3.0.3. No primary safety barriers (RCS, containment and fuel clad) were challenged and no primary or secondary safety or relief valves actuated during the event. The Unit 2 plant trip was uncomplicated and safety equipment operated as expected.

“Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure, in normal shutdown power alignment. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 1 at 100% power.

“The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.”

The MSIVs are shut with the steam generators (SG) discharging steam using the atmospheric dump valves. There is no primary to secondary leakage. Motor driven AFW pumps are running to maintain SG levels. RCS pressure remained above ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) discharge pressure.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160606en.html

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP

“On June 20, 2016 at 1540 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor tripped due to [reaching the] automatic Lo-Lo steam generator trip [setpoint] on [the] #4 steam generator. Concurrent with the reactor trip the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

“All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and main steam dump systems. The station is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.

“The cause is currently under investigation.

“This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).

“The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.”

There was no effect on Unit 1.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160621en.html

On the 24th of Oct, Watts Bar appears on a lengthy list of reactors potentially impacted by a new list of defective parts – these by Electroswitch, Weymouth, Mass (a problem known since at least May): http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20161024en.html
List of some Watts Bar defective parts: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/part21/2014/
A Counterfeit fraudulent parts notice http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/view?AccessionNumber=’ML12137A248′
Watts Bar-Browns Ferry TVA cables http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0736/ML073620319.pdf

Littel fuse defect http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1416/ML14160A783.pdf

REACTOR TRIP AND ECCS ACTUATION CAUSED BY TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE FAILURE http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160606en.html

http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1416/ML14160A783.pdf
http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1528/ML15282A051.pdf
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0847/supplement29/
http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1122/ML11224A052.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20160405211248/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/whistleblowers-terrified-at-tva-nuke-plants/
https://web.archive.org/web/20160415214335/http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2014/10/21/watts-bar-making-history-in-yet-another-century/
https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ouroperations/generalcounsel/nepaoverview/nepa/tritiumseis

https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2015/02/05/why-was-holtec-debarred-as-tva-contractor/

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003712849.pdf

Putting the Axe to the ‘Scram’ Myth May 17, 2011
The NRC glossary defines a “scram” as “the sudden shutting down of a nuclear reactor usually by rapid insertion of control rods.” …. According to [Warren] Nyer, someone
[involved in Chicago Pile 1] asked Wilson the reason for the red knob. Wilson replied you’d hit it if there was a problem. “Well, then what do you do?” he was asked. Wilson reportedly replied “You scram … out of here.’…” Tom Wellock NRC Historian https://web.archive.org/web/20160414112941/http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2011/05/17/putting-the-axe-to-the-scram-myth/

From Don Safer, Tennessee Environmental Council, Watts Bar 2 NRC Briefing Letter:”The Watts Bar reactors are antiquated, ice-condenser designs from the 1960’s. Construction started over 40 years ago. It is the height of public relations over-reach to call Unit 2 a “new” reactor. It is not the first new reactor of the 21 st century; it is the last old reactor of the 20 th century.

Dangerous, Old Design
The very design itself compromises public safety in favor of lower construction cost. The idea of surrounding the reactor core with baskets of ice to allow smaller, weaker, cheaper containment would not be considered reasonable today; it is a relic of early nuclear reactor design. Ice condenser reactors have been plagued with many problems over the years at the nine operating units in the U.S. Watts Bar Unit 2 is being licensed under the old 10 CFR Part 50 rules, not the Part 51 and 52 rules for new reactors.

There is a long history of opposition to the completion of Watts Bar Unit 2 by a number of environmental and clean energy advocacy groups including the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE) and Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL). The concerns about specific aspects of and problems with ice condenser designs have been brought to the NRC’s attention on many occasions.

The following comments by Lou Zeller of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League were submitted to the NRC in October of 2009 on the Unit 2 supplemental environmental impact statement: 8 The problems with ice condenser reactors were identified a decade ago but the NRC has failed to require and TVA has failed to take the steps necessary to protect the public.
8 Find the full document at: http://www.bredl.org/pdf2/091006FSEISscopingcommentsLZ.pdf Don Safer, Tennessee Environmental Council, Watts Bar 2 NRC Briefing Letter
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2014/safer-10-30-2014-meeting.pdf

SOME OF THIS MAY BE REPETIVE SINCE THE ORIGINAL IDEA WAS TO PUT SHORTER EXERPTS ON TOP AND MORE EXTENSIVE ONES AT THE BOTTOM. FURTHERMORE, THIS POST HAS BEEN WORKED ON OFF AND ON SINCE THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, IT NEEDED TO GO ON UP AND THERE IS NO MORE TIME FOR EDITING. AS MENTIONED IN ABOUT, IT’S SUPPOSED TO BE A RESEARCH NOTEBOOK, BLEMISHES AND ALL, ANYWAY.