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Power Lines to Brunswick Nuclear Power Station in North Carolina
Brunswick Nuclear Power Station in North Carolina and its Power Lines

July 12th 2016:
At approximately 2035 EDT, there was smoke in the Service Water Building with the trip of the 2C conventional service water pump. In accordance with plant procedures, unit-2 was ramped down to 70 percent power and the ‘Alert’ was declared at 2039 EDT. EAL (emergency action level) SA8.1 was entered for fire/smoke damage with degraded performance including visible damage to the service water pump. Service water pressure was eventually restored and the plant was stabilized. ” (USNRC)

The essential service water system (ESWS) circulates the water that cools the plant’s heat exchangers and other components before dissipating the heat into the environment. Because this includes cooling the systems that remove decay heat from both the primary system and the spent fuel rod cooling ponds, the ESWS is a safety-critical system.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_reactor_safety_system#Essential_service_water_system

Brunswick had a fire-explosion elsewhere in February: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160208en.html

Another defective breaker or contact? The whole Open Phase Electrical Defect issue which the NRC is dragging its feet on correcting?
Power Reactor Event Number: 52082
Facility: BRUNSWICK Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JONATHAN BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/12/2016
Notification Time: 21:08 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2016
Event Time: 20:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2016
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) – EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
BERN STAPLETON (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (NRR)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
Unit 2
SCRAM Code N
RX CRIT Y
Initial PWR 100
Initial RX Mode Power Operation
Current PWR 100
Current RX Mode Power Operation

Event Text
ALERT DECLARED FOR A FIRE IN THE SERVICE WATER BUILDING

At approximately 2039 EDT, there was smoke in the Service Water Building with the trip of the 2C service water pump. In accordance with plant procedures, unit-2 was ramped down to 70 percent power and the “Alert” was declared. EAL (emergency action level) SA8.1 was entered for damage with degraded performance including visible damage to the service water pump. Service water pressure was eventually restored by running both the 2A and 2B service water pumps.

At 2118 EDT, the site exited the “Alert” because service water pressure had been restored.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/14/16 AT 1456 EDT FROM LEE GRZECK TO DONG PARK * * *

The initial notification should read:

“At approximately 2035 EDT, there was smoke in the Service Water Building with the trip of the 2C conventional service water pump. In accordance with plant procedures, unit-2 was ramped down to 70 percent power and the ‘Alert’ was declared at 2039 EDT. EAL (emergency action level) SA8.1 was entered for fire/smoke damage with degraded performance including visible damage to the service water pump. Service water pressure was eventually restored and the plant was stabilized.

“At 2118 EDT, the site exited the ‘Alert’ when service water pressure had been restored, and the fire was confirmed out (i.e., no reflash within 30 minutes).”

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rich).”
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/en.html

From the US NRC:
The second phase of the aging assessment of nuclear plant service water systems (SWSs) was performed by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to support the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRCs) Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) program. The SWS was selected for study because of its essential role in the mitigation of and recovery from accident scenarios involving the potential for core-melt, and because it is subject to a variety of aging mechanisms. The objectives of the SWS task under the NPAR program are to identify and characterize the principal age-related degradation mechanisms relevant to this system, to assess the impact of aging degradation on operational readiness, and to provide a methodology for the management of aging on the service water aspect of nuclear plant safety.

The primary degradation mechanism in the SWSs, as stated in the Phase I assessment and confirmed by the analysis in Phase I, is corrosion compounded by biologic and inorganic accumulation. It then follows that the most effective means for mitigating degradation in these systems is to pursue appropriate programs to effectively control the water chemistry properties when possible and to use biocidal agents where necessary.

A methodology for producing a complete root-cause analysis was developed as a result of needs Identified in the Phase I assessment for a more formal procedure that would lend itself to a generic, standardized approach. It is recom-mended that this, or a similar methodology, be required as a part of the documentation for corrective maintenance performed on the safety-related portions of SWSs to provide an accurate focus for effective management of aging.
NUREG/CR-5379 PNL-7916 Vol. 2 RM, R9, Nuclear Plant Service Water System Aging Degradation Assessment, Phase IIhttp://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0403/ML040350095.pdf

The essential service water system (ESWS) circulates the water that cools the plant’s heat exchangers and other components before dissipating the heat into the environment. Because this includes cooling the systems that remove decay heat from both the primary system and the spent fuel rod cooling ponds, the ESWS is a safety-critical system.[2] Since the water is frequently drawn from an adjacent river, the sea, or other large body of water, the system can be fouled by seaweed, marine organisms, oil pollution, ice and debris.[2][3] In locations without a large body of water in which to dissipate the heat, water is recirculated via a cooling tower.
The failure of half of the ESWS pumps was one of the factors that endangered safety in the 1999 Blayais Nuclear Power Plant flood,[4][5] while a total loss occurred during the Fukushima I and Fukushima II nuclear accidents in 2011.[5][6]”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_reactor_safety_system#Essential_service_water_system