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[Update 2 April: Please note that despite the day of publication that this post is dead serious. The sick joke has been played upon the American people by the Obama Administration. Was making his “Nuclear Security” summit on April Fool’s Day intentional? Normally we try not to post on April Fool’s Day, but because of his sick timing of the so-called Nuclear Security Summit we needed to.]
The first known import of foreign nuclear waste from foreign origin fuel into the USA, to be dumped there, seems to have been from Chile. Tom D’Agostino, then of the NSSA and now of Fluor, signed a “Record of Decision” making this possible in January of 2009. Thus, the new category of “Gap” nuclear materials was born. “Gap” is US government euphemism for the nuclear garbage that no one else wants and which never had anything to do with the USA (meaning the original fuel, etc. came from elsewhere).
Almost certainly eligible for Italian-EU citizenship will Tom D’Agostino be sorry once he finds that there is rarely air conditioning in Italy? And that Italy itself has been poisoned by German nuclear waste? No air conditioning in hell either.
Chile actually has a much lower risk of terrorist attack than the USA. What’s more, there was an 8.8 earthquake during the period it was being shipped and they still were able to secure it for shipping within Chile. However, it points to the fact that such events could happen during nuclear waste shipment.
Below is apparently where this foreign fuel is being kept in South Carolina (SRS). The “cobwebs” were microbial, probably mold or other fungus since it appears more resistant to radiation.
Click to access nr14_srns-cobwebs.pdf
Meanwhile, the spent fuel pool in Chile, seen below, appears very clean.
Formerly HEU and now spent nuclear fuel, which may or may not still have had highly enriched uranium: “La Reina RECH-1 Reactor in Santiago, Chile Highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel sits in baskets in the spent fuel pond, ready for extraction at La Reina. NNSA-Flickr
Red blocks added to this diagram make clear that foreign origin uranium based spent nuclear fuel will end up buried someplace off-site in N. America. They indicate Clive in Utah and mention Three Rivers which is probably this nearby site Three Rivers Solid Waste: https://trswa.org However, there are Three Rivers Waste Dumps in 2 other US states.
Click to access L-AreaUpdate2015rev3.pdf
Clive Nuclear Waste Dump west of Salt Lake City, Utah.
WCS in west Texas appears likely, especially as it was mentioned for the dumping of the 200 tonnes of German spent nuclear fuel
Earthquake induced road damage at the time the US was moving the nuclear waste from Chile. Chile’s infrastructure looks as good or better than the US or Europe. Clearly they could have kept that nuclear waste.
Below shows train overturned by 1886 South Carolina earthquake. Imported Nuclear Waste Travels by Rail from Charleston, South Carolina, to Savannah River Site
The 1886 South Carolina “earthquake is estimated to have been 7.0 on the moment magnitude scale with a Mercalli intensity of X (Extreme)“. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1886_Charleston_earthquake
By the end of 2013 HEU materials had been removed from Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Latvia, Libya, Mexico, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam. http://www.ne.anl.gov/pdfs/gtri/2013-12-12%204%20Year%20Effort.pdf Russia took some of it. The US the rest. Since then Switzerland has sent their HEU and plutonium waste to dump upon America. Many of these are considered stable, developed, countries which even have their own nuclear reactors, and could secure their own waste materials. Most are probably more secure from terrorism than the USA. If the HEU was unused they could downblend it themselves for their own nuclear reactors. Even Mexico has a nuclear power station. The Swiss plutonium which just arrived in America was kept in the Paul Scherrer Institute in vaults. The PSI is protected by a very heavy tall gate and the plutonium was probably in vaults in an underground bunker. More than any other fact, this unveils the so-called non-proliferation/nuclear security as simply a plot to dump world nuclear waste upon America to be buried there.
If Chile was unable or unwilling to secure nuclear waste, then they should never have had a nuclear reactor or fuel. The same is true of all countries. And, if France and the UK didn’t want to take some responsibility then they shouldn’t have sent the fuel there. Spain shouldn’t have made the fuel assemblies if they didn’t want to be responsible at all. The same is true for all countries. The US had taken back spent fuel from US origin fuel in 2001.
“When GTRI was founded in May 2004, the program was only authorized to repatriate certain types of U.S.-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel under the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRRSNF) acceptance program to the United States. Non-U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel was not authorized to be brought to the United States. However, this policy was changed in January 2009, and GTRI now has the authority to remove non-U.S.-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel to the U.S., provided that the material meets certain acceptance criteria. During the April 2009 visit to Chile, GTRI officials determined that the British- and French-origin HEU nuclear fuel meets the required acceptance criteria, thereby making the material eligible for removal to the United States. End Background.”
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SANTIAGO486_a.html Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
According to the NNSA itself: “The operation was also the first shipment of HEU spent fuel to the United States under a Record of Decision signed by NNSA Administrator D’Agostino in January 2009 that allows the United States to accept limited amounts of non-U.S.-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel to provide additional flexibility to address nuclear material around the world. This shipment from Chile, which included non-U.S.-origin HEU from the RECH-1 and RECH-2 research reactors, was the first to be conducted under the new decision.” http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/04.08.10 Where are the limitations? Tom D’Agostino now workers for Fluor, one of the primary contractors for the Savannah River Nuclear Site. Recently the US government filed suit against them for false claims: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-suit-against-savannah-river-nuclear-solutions-llc-and-fluor-federal
The US has no place to put its own spent commercial nuclear fuel. Although it is more likely that something useful might be extracted from spent nuclear formerly HEU fuel than LEU fuel, the economics are unclear and the dangers are high and it makes more nuclear waste: “In 1992, the DOE concluded that recovery of enriched uranium for reuse in weapons programs was no longer necessary because of the reduction in the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile… In May 2006, DOE approved the Enriched Uranium Disposition Mission, which uses the H Canyon facilities for disposition of the large inventory of used nuclear fuel from foreign and domestic research reactors and excess enriched uranium and plutonium bearing materials across the DOE complex… As required by law, disposition paths will be identified for all nuclear materials brought to H Canyon.” http://www.srs.gov/general/news/factsheets/hc.pdf “Reprocessing is also the option that generates the largest amount of radioactive waste.” http://ieer.org/resource/factsheets/reprocessing-spent-nuclear-fuel/ So, apparently the nuclear waste is stored at L Canyon, and then possibly “processed” in H Canyon, for the waste to be dumped or buried in Somewhere, USA.
While almost 99% was nuclear waste, apparently 1% was non-irradiated, but in fuel rod form (275 grams/18455 grams). The LEU was provided by Russia, so it wasn’t even a business deal for the USA. This is a comparatively small amount, but nonetheless more nuclear garbage for North America. They put the original enrichment, but since it was spent, used, it is no longer that enriched. “Lightly irradiated” is still irradiated and non-pure. It is still nuclear garbage. And, the US DOE/NNSA offered for the US taxpayer to PAY for the removal of this nuclear waste from Chile to the USA, and funding to replace HEU with LEU.
Excerpts from Wikileaks. Full text below excerpts.
“The Rech-1 research reactor was fully converted to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in May 2006, but is currently storing 13.6 kilograms of British-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel enriched to 45 percent, which is the material eligible for removal to the U.S. The LEU fuel for the Rech-1 reactor was provided by the Russian Federation.
The Rech-2 research reactor is also a multipurpose, pool-type reactor that was originally engineered at 10 MW for Chilean defense programs and first achieved criticality in 1977. In 1989, the reactor was redesigned and licensed to operate at 2 MW, but is currently in extended shutdown. Unlike the Rech-1 research reactor in Santiago, the Rech-2 reactor is not converted to use LEU fuel and still contains 4.3 kilograms of French-origin HEU enriched to 90 percent in the reactor core, which is additional material eligible for removal to the U.S. The HEU raw material for the Rech-2 reactor was originally provided by France, but the fuel assemblies for this reactor were manufactured in Spain. 7. Although the redesign and commissioning of the reactor was successful, this reactor has seen very limited operation and fuel assemblies in the reactor core are therefore regarded as lightly irradiated; therefore, they are not considered to be “spent nuclear fuel.” There are also two fresh HEU assemblies (about 275 grams of fresh HEU), as well as a small quantity of uranyl nitrate liquid (280 grams) stored in the reactor vault. The two fresh HEU assemblies and the uranyl nitrate are also French-origin and enriched to 90 percent. (COMMENT: The uranyl nitrate is a liquid chemical compound of uranium that does not meet transportation requirements to the U.S. To remedy this situation, CCHEN has agreed to use its existing capabilities to convert and downblend the HEU to LEU in country. The two fresh HEU fuel assemblies are eligible to be removed to the U.S. End comment.)”
“Representatives from DOE/NNSA officially offered to cover all costs associated with the removal of the British- and French-origin HEU fuel at the Rech-1 and Rech-2 research reactors as well as the U.S.-origin sealed radioactive sources. Under this proposal, DOE/NNSA would be responsible for providing the transportation casks and paying to transport this fuel to the United States in a safe and secure manner.
— Representatives from DOE/NNSA also agreed to provide funding to CCHEN to fabricate LEU replacement fuel for the removed HEU materials. It was estimated that the replacement quantity of LEU is approximately 32 kilograms, which is a quantity equivalent to the core replacement.
— DOE/NNSA and CCHEN agreed to include in the upcoming shipment the more than 400 U.S.-origin radioactive sources that have been jointly packaged and stored at the Lo Aguirre facility.
— Representatives from CCHEN agreed to convert and downblend a small quantity of HEU uranyl nitrate (approximately 280 grams) currently stored in the HEU storage vault by April 2010.”
“DOE/NNSA representatives described the criteria of the revised… DOE Record of Decision that grants provisional authorization to accept “gap” nuclear material in the United States and noted that, since no commercial option exists to accept the HEU material, it could be sent to the United States if it meets the acceptance criteria of the Savannah River Site.” https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SANTIAGO486_a.html
Chile is ranked as less at risk for terrorism than the USA. France actually ranks as less at risk than the USA. The UK is ranked as slightly more at risk. But, that’s also not America’s responsibility. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Terrorism_Index Since the UK has no good place for nuclear waste it certainly should not be continuing to make more. However, Chile benefitted from the use of the uranium and should take some or all responsibility.
If this had been good quality HEU, it might have been sent to the Y-12 Facility. How secure is that?
Look what happened to the highest security section, “Protected Area”, the HEU Manufacturing Facility, of the US Nuclear Y-12 facility, “The facility’s missions are several: to manufacture certain components for nuclear weapons; to test the reliability of certain components for nuclear weapons; and to store highly enriched uranium,…”
“In the dark of night on July 28, 2012, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, an 82 year-old nun and two Army veterans, ages 57 and 63, cut their way through four layers of fences and reached a building where the Department of Energy stores enriched uranium.
There the trio spray-painted antiwar slogans, hung crime tape and banners with biblical phrases, splashed blood, and sang hymns. When a security guard finally arrived, the group offered him bread and read aloud a prepared message about “transform[ing] weapons into real life-giving alternatives to build true peace.” Then the group surrendered to the guard’s custody… The Y-12 National Security Complex is located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Although the Department of Energy administers the facility, private contractors perform virtually all of its operations. The facility’s missions are several: to manufacture certain components for nuclear weapons; to test the reliability of certain components for nuclear weapons; and to store highly enriched uranium, much of which is … Nos. 14-5220/5221/5222 United States v. Walli, et al. Page 2” http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0086p-06.pdf
Entire document regarding Chilean fuel from Wikileaks, in original order:
“Canonical ID: 09SANTIAGO486_a Subject: GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE EFFORTS TO REMOVE BRITISH- AND FRENCH-ORIGIN HEU FUEL FROM CHILE From: Chile Santiago To: Department of Energy, Ecuador Quito, Group Destinations Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR-Mercado Común del Sur), Secretary of State Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Previous Handling Restrictions: — Not Assigned –Archive Status: — Not Assigned –Type: TE Locator: TEXT ONLINE Reference(s): — N/A or Blank –Executive Order (E.O.): — Not Assigned –Markings: — Not Assigned –Enclosure: — Not Assigned –Concepts: — Not Assigned –TAGS: Chile [CI] Nuclear Non-Proliferation [KNNP] Political Affairs–Arms Controls and Disarmament [PARM] Technology and Science–Energy Technology [TRGY] Office: — N/A or Blank –Document Character Count: 13216 Date: 2009 May 22, 15:57 (Friday)
UNCLAS SANTIAGO 000486
DOE/NNSA/NA-21 FORABIENIAWSKI/KCUMMINS/SDICKERSON NSC FOR GSAYMORE/JCONNERY STATE FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC AND EEB/ESC/IEC STATE/ISN/FO FOR RSTRATFORD STATE/ISN/NESS FOR BPLAPP/DFENSTERMACHER STATE/VC FOR RGOTTEMOELLER
SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM, KNNP, TRGY, CI
SUBJECT: GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE EFFORTS TO REMOVE
BRITISH- AND FRENCH-ORIGIN HEU FUEL FROM CHILE
1. SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), met with the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN) from April 21-23 to begin planning for the removal of the British- and French-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel from Chile to the United States. At the conclusion of the visit, a meeting summary was signed by Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Global Threat Reduction, Andrew Bieniawski, and the Executive Director of CCHEN, Fernando Lopez. The summary states that the HEU nuclear fuel in Chile meets DOE-NNSA acceptance criteria and formalizes a joint GTRI-CCHEN commitment to complete the removal by April 2010, effectively removing all HEU from Chile. Most importantly, the removal of this material to the U.S. will contribute to President Obama’s goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years and will be completed prior to the May 2010 NPT REVCON. End Summary.
2. BACKGROUND: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) seeks to prevent terrorists from acquiring the nuclear and radiological material that could be used in weapons of mass destruction and other acts of terrorism. GTRI supports this goal by reducing and protecting vulnerable nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites worldwide. A cooperative, voluntary program, GTRI provides international support for national programs to identify, secure, recover, and/or dispose of these materials that pose a threat to the international community. GTRI is currently cooperating with more than 124 countries worldwide, including numerous countries throughout the Latin American region.
3. When GTRI was founded in May 2004, the program was only authorized to repatriate certain types of U.S.-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel under the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRRSNF) acceptance program to the United States. Non-U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel was not authorized to be brought to the United States. However, this policy was changed in January 2009, and GTRI now has the authority to remove non-U.S.-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel to the U.S., provided that the material meets certain acceptance criteria. During the April 2009 visit to Chile, GTRI officials determined that the British- and French-origin HEU nuclear fuel meets the required acceptance criteria, thereby making the material eligible for removal to the United States. End Background.
——————————Two Research Reactors in Chile ——————————
4. The Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN) currently maintains two nuclear research reactors: the Rech-1 research reactor, which is located at the La Reina Nuclear Center in Santiago; and the Rech-2 research reactor, which is located at the Lo Aguirre Nuclear Center about 30 kilometers west of Santiago.
5. The Rech-1 research reactor is a 5 megawatt (MW) multipurpose, pool-type reactor that first achieved criticality on October 13, 1974. Operating about 24 hours a week, the main mission of the Rech-1 research reactor is to produce medical isotopes for the Chilean medical industry. The Rech-1 research reactor was fully converted to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in May 2006, but is currently storing 13.6 kilograms of British-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel enriched to 45 percent, which is the material eligible for removal to the U.S. The LEU fuel for the Rech-1 reactor was
provided by the Russian Federation.
6. The Rech-2 research reactor is also a multipurpose, pool-type reactor that was originally engineered at 10 MW for Chilean defense programs and first achieved criticality in 1977. In 1989, the reactor was redesigned and licensed to operate at 2 MW, but is currently in extended shutdown. Unlike the Rech-1 research reactor in Santiago, the Rech-2 reactor is not converted to use LEU fuel and still contains 4.3 kilograms of French-origin HEU enriched to 90 percent in the reactor core, which is additional material eligible for removal to the U.S. The HEU raw material for the Rech-2 reactor was originally provided by France, but the fuel assemblies for this reactor were manufactured in Spain.
7. Although the redesign and commissioning of the reactor was successful, this reactor has seen very limited operation and fuel assemblies in the reactor core are therefore regarded as lightly irradiated; therefore, they are not considered to be “spent nuclear fuel.” There are also two fresh HEU assemblies (about 275 grams of
fresh HEU), as well as a small quantity of uranyl nitrate liquid (280 grams) stored in the reactor vault. The two fresh HEU assemblies and the uranyl nitrate are also French-origin and enriched to 90 percent. (COMMENT: The uranyl nitrate is a liquid chemical compound of uranium that does not meet transportation requirements to the U.S. To remedy this situation, CCHEN has agreed to use its existing capabilities to convert and downblend the HEU to LEU in country. The two fresh HEU fuel assemblies are eligible to be removed to the U.S. End comment.)
——————————————— ——-The Plan: Chile Virtually Free of HEU by April 2010 ——————————————— ——-
8. In summary, the total quantities of HEU nuclear fuel and material identified for removal to the U.S. are: 13.6 kilograms of British-origin HEU enriched to 45 percent from the Rech-1 research reactor; and 4.3 kilograms of lightly irradiated French-origin HEU enriched to 90 percent and 275 grams of French-origin fresh HEU enriched to 90 percent from the Rech-2 research reactor.
9. Following an agreed path forward on removal, Chile would effectively become HEU-free by April 2010 (meaning only a very small quantity of HEU, less than 1 kilogram, would remain in the form of fission chambers for nuclear research). This would contribute directly to President Obama’s goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years. In addition, upon successful implementation of the agreed path forward, this progress could be announced in May 2010, at the upcoming NPT REVCON.
10. Finally, GTRI will also repatriate U.S.-origin disused radioactive sealed sources to the U.S. for disposition. Last year, a GTRI team from the Los Alamos National Laboratory packaged over 400 disused U.S.-origin radioactive sealed sources for future return to the U.S. The packaged sources are securely stored at the Lo
Aguirre site and will be repatriated to the U.S. along with the foreign-origin HEU fuel from the two research reactors.
—————————–Summary of GTRI-CCHEN Meeting —————————–
11. Begin text:
Meeting Summary
Discussions between DOE/NNSA and the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN)
April 23, 2009
Representatives from the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN) met in Santiago on April 21-23, 2009 to discuss cooperative efforts related to the removal of British- and French-origin Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from the Rech-1 and Rech-2 research reactors to the U.S. for storage and disposition.
The primary purpose of the visit was to discuss the removal of British-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel from the Rech-1 research reactor and French-origin fresh and lightly-irradiated HEU from the Rech-2 research reactor to the U.S. for storage and disposition.
Below is a key summary of the meeting:
— DOE/NNSA representatives noted the very long and productive relationship with Chile regarding peaceful nuclear cooperation and expressed their gratitude for Chile’s participation and important contributions to NNSA nonproliferation programs, especially in the area of nuclear and radiological security.
— CCHEN recognized the willingness of DOE to help address the issue of removal of the British and French-origin HEU fuel.
— Experts from DOE/NNSA and CCHEN discussed the removal of the HEU at both Rech-1 and Rech-2 as well as the already packaged sealed radiological sources to the United States and agreed to the following:
Removal of the British- and French-origin HEU fuel from Rech-1 and
Rech-2 and the already packaged sealed radiological sources:
— Both DOE/NNSA and CCHEN expressed their ongoing interest in continuing to work together to remove the British-origin HEU spent fuel and French-origin fresh and lightly irradiated HEU fuel from the Rech-1 and Rech-2 research reactors to the United States.
— DOE/NNSA representatives described the criteria of the revised
DOE Record of Decision that grants provisional authorization to accept “gap” nuclear material in the United States and noted that, since no commercial option exists to accept the HEU material, it could be sent to the United States if it meets the acceptance criteria of the Savannah River Site.
— CCHEN representatives briefed about Rech-1 and Rech-2 fuel status, explaining characteristics and actual condition of the HEU spent fuel of Rech-1 and slightly irradiated fuel at Rech-2. Additionally, CCHEN representatives described their fuel fabrication capabilities.
— DOE/NNSA representatives visited the Rech-1 and Rech-2 reactor facilities to begin a preliminary characterization of the HEU fuel and the fuel fabrication facilities.
— DOE/NNSA representatives noted that the British- and French-origin HEU fuel meets the Record of Decision’s criteria and agreed to continue plans to remove the material to the United States by April 30, 2010.
— Representatives from DOE/NNSA officially offered to cover all costs associated with the removal of the British- and French-origin HEU fuel at the Rech-1 and Rech-2 research reactors as well as the U.S.-origin sealed radioactive sources. Under this proposal, DOE/NNSA would be responsible for providing the transportation casks and paying to transport this fuel to the United States in a safe and secure manner.
— Representatives from DOE/NNSA also agreed to provide funding to CCHEN to fabricate LEU replacement fuel for the removed HEU materials. It was estimated that the replacement quantity of LEU is approximately 32 kilograms, which is a quantity equivalent to the core replacement.
— DOE/NNSA and CCHEN agreed to include in the upcoming shipment the more than 400 U.S.-origin radioactive sources that have been jointly packaged and stored at the Lo Aguirre facility.
— Representatives from CCHEN agreed to convert and downblend a small quantity of HEU uranyl nitrate (approximately 280 grams) currently stored in the HEU storage vault by April 2010.
— Representatives from CCHEN confirmed that with (1) the upcoming removal of the British-origin and French-origin HEU fuel and (2) the downblending of the small quantity of HEU uranyl nitrate, effectively all remaining HEU would have been removed from Chile. Representatives from DOE/NNSA and CCHEN also discussed sustainability and next steps to be taken on this important topic.
— Both DOE/NNSA and CCHEN officials signed this record of meeting to formalize the commitment to remove the fuel by April 30, 2010.
Next Steps in this area:
— Based on this understanding, DOE/NNSA will immediately develop and submit a proposed draft contract to CCHEN to support removal of the fresh and irradiated HEU fuel.
— DOE will consult with IAEA and Portugal to determine if the RERTR meeting planned for 2010 can be held in Santiago, Chile. DOE will report back to CCHEN by May 30, 2009.
— DOE/NNSA has designated Mr. Ray Greenberg Jr., Chile Country Officer, and Mr. Chuck Messick, Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program Manager, as the lead U.S. points of contact on this issue.
— CCHEN has designed Mr. Juan Klein and Mr. Gonzalo Torres as the lead Chilean points of contact on this issue.
— Both sides expressed their great appreciation for this agreed path forward, which lays out expanded cooperation with Chile.
/SIGNED/ /SIGNED/
Andrew Bieniawski Fernando Lopez Deputy Assistant Secretary Executive Director, CCHEN For Global Threat Reduction DOE/NNSA
End Text. 12. Department of Energy contacts are Andrew Bieniawski (202 586-0775), Andrew.Bieniawski@nnsa.doe.gov; Sarah Dickerson (202 586-0686), Sarah.Dickerson@nnsa.doe.gov; and Raymond Greenberg, Jr. (202 586-8864), Raymond.F.Greenberg.Jr@nnsa.doe.gov. Department of State point of contact is Brendan Plapp (202 647-6109), PlappBB@state.gov. SIMONS” https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SANTIAGO486_a.html
“GTRI and CCHEN have a long track record of working together on nuclear nonproliferation issues. This history includes the return of all U.S.– origin HEU spent fuel to the United States in 2001, … “T h e F o u r – Y e a r e F F o r T r e D u C I N G N u C L e a r D a N G e r S” http://www.ne.anl.gov/pdfs/gtri/2013-12-12%204%20Year%20Effort.pdf (The title of the document makes no sense so we won’t even bother to format it! The NNSA won’t even let people see it, but this is from ANL, Argonne National Lab.)
Mining Awareness + 
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