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Former TEPCO executives were indicted on Monday, 29 Feb., 2016, over TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, and are expected to be put on trial next year. This is upon insistence by a Japan Citizens’ Panel. Japan’s Citizens’ Panels were “introduced after World War Two to curb bureaucratic overreach“, according to Reuters (29-Feb-2016).
idaho National Lab INL gov Fukushima 4 reactors
Former Tepco execs indicted over Fukushima nuclear disaster
Posted:Mon, 29 Feb 2016 07:31:00 GMT
TOKYO (Reuters) – Three former Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco) executives were indicted on Monday for failing to take safety measures to prevent the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi plant in 2011, a Tokyo District Court official said.http://feeds.reuters.com/~r/reuters/environment/~3/jkWFVh88ty0/story01.htm
[Update: According to this article the trial could be as soon as 6 months: https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2016/03/01/tepco-boss-indictment-major-step-for-justice-trial-may-reveal-hidden-info-about-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/%5D

Is this the opening of a new period of justice? Is the period of flagrant impunity of bureaucrats and corporate executives coming to an end? Bad people beware! It is time to turn to the side of good. A lot should come out in the trial. Unless Japan becomes an open dictatorship or the indicted die mysteriously.

Meanwhile, five years on, the three melted down nuclear reactors, and probably melted down spent fuel pools, continue to belch lethal radioactive materials into the air and water. There appears to be no serious effort to seek solutions, rather innovation appears blocked out from even arriving at the disaster site. Furthermore, there are well-known means of filtering tritium. But, it is cheaper for TEPCO and those in charge of clean-up to just dump it into the Pacific, while lying and saying they can’t filter it.

Early US NOAA model of dispersion: http://sos.noaa.gov/Datasets/dataset.php?id=332 Fukushima has continued to discharge radioactive materials into the air, and water for years, as even admitted by TEPCO.

In a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people not to be on the side of the executioners.” — Albert Camus http://www.archives.gov/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/introductory-essays.pdf
Japan War Crimes NARA cover

Prime Minister Abe’s War Criminal Grandfather Was Never Punished; On the Contrary

The indictment can but remind us all of Prime Minister Abe’s war criminal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, known as the Showa Era Devil, and the mystery of how he got out of jail and went on to become Prime Minister twice, sequentially. His biological brother Sato also served as Prime Minister. Kishi’s grandson Shinzo Abe became twice prime minister in 2006 and 2012, and remains Prime Minister.

Nobusuke Kishi (1896-1987) was held as a Class A World War II war criminal, but released. This is particularly shocking as he signed the declaration of war against the US, and Britain, in 1941. He was Minister of Munitions during World War Two. And, yet, he was released from prison and served twice as Prime Minister of Japan from 25 February 1957 to 19 July 1960. If you believe a book cited in Wikipedia, Kishi was a sex addict, so would probably do anything to get out of jail. (Please do not read the current Wikipedia article on Kishi unless you are an adult! It is unnecessarily obscene.) Drug addiction has also been implied elsewhere. This suggests psychological disturbances and would have made him easy to control, or appear so.

However, if the following information provided by Samuels (2001) is true, it would seem more likely that Kishi bribed his way out of prison: “There were rumors that Kishi had already enriched himself and his political allies while serving as a bureaucrat in Manchuria. Connections to the opium trade through radical nationalists and to industrialists, combined with his personal control of the movement of capital in and out of the puppet state, made Kishi singularly influential– and likely very rich. Indeed, while still in China Kishi became known for his consummate skill in laundering money. It was said that he could move as much money around as he wished “with a single telephone call,” and that he did so both legally and illegally and for public and private purposes. By the time Kishi returned to Tokyo in 1939, he had built up an impressive network of political allies inside and outside government.” Read the article here: “Working Paper No. 83, December 2001 – Kishi and Corruption:  An Anatomy of the 1955 System by Richard J. Samuels http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp83.html (Emphasis added) Perhaps the German war criminals couldn’t get their money back from Swiss bankers to pay bribes? And, Kishi could get his money?

The Japanese were supposedly more successful in the destruction of incriminating documents, than the Germans: NARA Japan Document destruction post WWII
Researching Japanese war crimes records : Introductory essays, Edward Drea, et al, the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, NARA, 2006
http://www.archives.gov/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/

Nobusuke Kishi, in 1935 “became one of the top officials involved in the industrial development of Manchukuo“, the puppet state which Imperialist Japan set up in northeast China and Inner Mongolia (i.e. Japanese occupation of Manchuria). Nobusuke Kishi “was later accused of exploiting Chinese forced labor. Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō, himself a veteran of the Manchurian campaign, appointed Kishi Minister of Commerce and Industry in 1941“. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobusuke_Kishi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchukuo The goal of the occupation of Manchuria appears to have been to grab China’s resources. Slave labor in mines of this region fed Japan’s war machine.In 1935, Kishi introduced a Five Year Plan for Manchukuo, focusing on heavy industry intended to allow Japan to fight a “total war” with the Soviet Union or the United States by 1940.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobusuke_Kishi

Kishi was born Nobusuke Satō, “but left his family at a young age to move in with the more affluent Kishi family, adopting their family name. His biological younger brother, Eisaku Satō, would also go on to become a prime minister… Kishi attended Tokyo Imperial University (now the University of Tokyo) and entered the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1920… The Japanese conscripted hundreds of thousands of Chinese as slave labor to work in Manchukuo’s heavy industrial plants. In 1937, Kishi signed a degree calling for the use of slave labour to be conscripted both in Manchukuo and in northern China, stating that in these “times of emergency”(i.e war with China), industry needed to grow at all costs, and slavery would have to be used as the money to pay the workers was not there.[32]…. In 1940, Kishi become a minister in the government of Prince Fumimaro Konoe. Kishi intended to create within Japan the same sort of totalitarian “national defense state” that he had pioneered in Manchuria, but these plans ran into vigorous opposition from various vested interests.[44] In December 1940, Konoe dropped Kishi from his cabinet.[45] Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō, himself a veteran of the Manchurian campaign, appointed Kishi Minister of Munitions in October 1941.[46] The mandate of the Tōjo government provided by the Shōwa Emperor was to prepare for Japan for a war with the United States, and to this end Tōjo appointed Kishi to his cabinet as the best man to prepare Japan economically for the “total war” he had envisioned.[47]

On 1 December 1941, Kishi voted in the Cabinet for war with the United States and Britain, and signed the declaration of war issued on 7 December 1941. [48] Kishi had known General Tōjō since 1931, and was one of his closest allies in the Cabinet. Kishi was also elected to the Lower House of the Diet of Japan in April 1942 as a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.[49] As Munitions Minister, Kishi was deeply involved in taking thousands of Koreans and Chinese to work as slaves in Japan’s factories and mines during the war.[50] During the war, 670,000 Koreans and 41,862 Chinese were taken to work as slave labor under the most degrading conditions in Japan; the majority did not survive the experience.[51]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobusuke_Kishi

About the International Military Tribunal for the Far East:
Following the model used at the Nuremberg Trials in Germany, the Allies established three broad categories. “Class A” charges, alleging crimes against peace, were to be brought against Japan’s top leaders who had planned and directed the war. Class B and C charges, which could be leveled at Japanese of any rank, covered conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, respectively. Unlike the Nuremberg Trials, the charge of crimes against peace was a prerequisite to prosecution—only those individuals whose crimes included crimes against peace could be prosecuted by the Tribunal. The indictment accused the defendants of promoting a scheme of conquest that “contemplated and carried out…murdering, maiming and ill-treating prisoners of war (and) civilian internees…forcing them to labor under inhumane conditions…plundering public and private property, wantonly destroying cities, towns and villages beyond any justification of military necessity; (perpetrating) mass murder, rape, pillage, brigandage, torture and other barbaric cruelties upon the helpless civilian population of the over-run countries.” Keenan issued a press statement along with the indictment: “War and treaty-breakers should be stripped of the glamour of national heroes and exposed as what they really are—plain, ordinary murderers“. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Military_Tribunal_for_the_Far_East

Prime Minister Abe has declared his religion as Shinto. However, this does not appear to be the nature appreciation-animist version, where kami (spirit) lives in all things. Rather, the Shinto on the march today in Abe’s government appears a nationalist-ancestor worship version: Veneration of imperialist war criminal ancestors. His grandfather Kishi was called Shōwa no yōkai (the Shōwa era monster/devil). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobusuke_Kishi (As accessed in 2013; This detail appears to have been purged.) See: https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2013/12/15/japanese-fascism-and-trying-to-plug-the-leaks-about-leaks-at-fukushima/

In 2002, the US government released “Intelligence records monitoring the post-1948 activities of released major war criminal suspect Kishi Nobusuke, prominent bureaucrat who worked with the Japanese Army in the economic development of Manchukuo and later served as senior official of the post-Pearl Harbor Ministry of Munitions.” (“Researching Japanese war crimes records : Introductory essays, Edward Drea, et al, the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, NARA, 2006 http://www.archives.gov/iwg/japanese-war-crimes )

Kishi Nobusuke’s Release and Rise to PM; The Mysterious M-Fund

Those Japanese activists who labored to document and publicize the atrocities of the Shōwa regime must have found the exoneratation of the Emperor of responsibility for the war, and the release and embrace of war criminals like Nobusuke Kishi, by the Allies, inexplicable. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Military_Tribunal_for_the_Far_East

In “America’s Favorite War Criminal: Kishi Nobusuke and the Transformation of U.S.-Japan Relations“, July 1995, Michael Schaller states that “Evidence in a variety of open and still classified U.S. government documents strongly indicates that early in 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower … authorized the CIA to provide secret campaign funds to Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke–formerly an accused war criminal–and selected members of the Liberal Democratic Party… Kishi’s prewar friendship with Ambassador Grew assisted his political rehabilitation. A small but influential group of private Americans, who played a key role in drafting the Reverse Course policy, identified Kishi as among those best suited to lead the new Japan…. These men had prewar ties with numerous Japanese business and political leaders purged after 1945 and served as mediators between them and American officials… resented Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s resistance to rearmament and military cooperation with the U.S… By 1953, with financial backing from industrialist Fujiyama Aiichiro and Kodama Yoshio (a fellow Sugamo inmate who amassed a fortune in wartime China and began working with U.S. intelligence officials during the Korean war when he smuggled tungsten out of China), Kishi emerged as leader of the Democratic Party, one of two major conservative groups vying for power.” Emphasis added. Read the article here: http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp11.html

Upon the end of the Cold War, and his retirement, professor and former CIA analyst, Chalmers Johnson became an outspoken critic of American Foreign Policy and speaker of truths. So, yes, this is the same Chalmers Johnson.

In “The 1955 System and the American Connection: A Bibliographic Introduction“, July 1995, Chalmers Johnson, former CIA analyst, states that “There is no doubt today that Kodama returned to Japan in 1945 from China as the former head of the Navy’s Kodama Kikan (Kodama Agency) a fabulously rich war profiteer. He transferred stolen diamonds and platinum before he went to prison to Hatoyama Ichiro and Kono Ichiro, and the funds these materials produced when sold by Kono, about $175 million, financed the creation of the Liberal Party. The go-between in this famous operation was the kuromaku Tsuji Karoku, whom the Diet questioned in 1947 about the alleged use of former military and black market funds to influence politics… On April 4, 1976, the New York Times summarized what Kodama did for the CIA and for Lockheed: “Last week there was more evidence of the agency’s [CIA’s] apparently ubiquitous involvement: its officials knew 20 years ago that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation bribed Japanese politicians in connection with the sale of F-104 fighter planes to the Japanese Government. In a period of 20 years (1956 to 1975) Lockheed paid $12.6 million to top Japanese officials to sell $700 million worth of aircraft… Another service Kodama performed was to counter left-wing protesters by mobilizing “some 50,000 gamblers, street vendors, racketeers, and members of the violent right to take part in the so-called ‘Mass Mobilization for Greeting Ike’ and to help the police keep ‘order’ during the presidential visit.”These funds probably came from the M-Fund; it was available and had been created for precisely such needs” (Emphasis our own.) Read the entire article here: http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp11.html

According to “Japan’s “M-Fund” Memorandum“, January 7, 1991, by Norbert A. Schlei, former Assistant US AG-General Counsel: “Such a fund was duly created, utilizing primarily money and property that had been in the possession of the Japanese armed forces at war’s end after having been seized during the war in occupied areas” It was turned over to the U.S. after World War II, and jointly controlled. During renegotiations of the US-Japan 1952 Security Treaty, then VP Richard Nixon turned control of the the M-Fund money over to Japanese officials. By 1991 the Fund had grown to more than $500 billion, said Schlei, and dominated Japanese politics, and was a major force in the economy. Schlei adds that it “is not controlled by the government of Japan or even by the Liberal Democratic Party, but is, rather, the private preserve of a small group of individuals.” While Schlei says that it “seems inconceivable” that Nixon “knowingly “gave” the Fund to Prime Minister Kishi and his associates as individuals, free of any governmental or institutional control“, it appears clear that he must have, if what Schlei says is true. Schlei states that “The fact is, however, that beginning with Prime Minister Kishi, the Fund has been treated as the private preserve of the individuals into whose control it has fallen. Those individuals have felt able to appropriate huge sums from the Fund for their own personal and political purposes“. (Emphasis our own). Read this amazing article here: http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp11.html Reading this, it certainly makes control of the “M-Fund” appear to be a mega-bribe by Tricky Dick Nixon to get PM Kishi to agree to allow the US to continue use of Japan as a military base, and to allow transport of US nuclear weapons across its territory. That is what it looks like. Mr. Schlei served as Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the Justice Department’s Office of General Counsel from 1962 to 1966. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/23/us/norbert-a-schlei-73-legal-adviser-in-kennedy-johnson-era.html

Samuels (2001) adds more tantalizing comment: “It was only after Kishi formed his first cabinet that he began to attract funds from some of the more elite trading companies, such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, and from manufacturing firms such as Sumitomo Chemicals. But even then, his relationships to them were dwarfed by his relationships to the non-zaibatsu companies such as Nissan, Marubeni, and Ito Chu, relationships that had been cemented in Manchuria two decades earlierAs poorly documented as the M-Fund and its transformation into “public resources” are, there is still an even more difficult (and likely more consequential) aspect of Kishi’s political activities– his relationships with ultra-nationalists and the underworld.” The entire document can be read here: “Working Paper No. 83, December 2001: Kishi and Corruption:  An Anatomy of the 1955 System” by Richard J. Samuels http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp83.html

Obviously, this is a deep and complicated topic. Many Ph.D. dissertations can, and probably have, been written on it. Nonetheless, reading the above papers may offer a start to unveiling clues as to the psychopathic behavior of the Japanese government, which is re-opening more nuclear power stations, even as the bleeding of radioactive materials from Fukushima continues.

In “The 1955 System and the American Connection: A Bibliographic Introduction” Chalmers Johnson points out that “Watanabe Osamu makes a different case, arguing that company unions and political control of regional and local government in Japan through pork-barrel projects undercut political development (Seiji kaikaku to kenpo kaisei [Political Reform and Constitutional Change], Aoki Shoten, 1994. For a review of Watanabe’s book, see Social Science Japan, April 1995, pp. 28-29.)http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp11.html However, they do not appear to be mutually exclusive. The M-Fund and Pork Barrel projects could work hand and hand.

JPRI Critique Vol X, Special Note (May 2003)
Obituary and Comment: Norbert Schlei and The M-Fund

http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique_X_Special.html

See more here: http://www.jpri.org

An interesting and important interview: “Interview with Chalmers Johnson Part 2. From CIA Analyst to Best-Selling Scholarhttp://www.inmotionmagazine.com/global/cj_int/cj_int2.html

Regarding Kishi’s biological brother, “recent inquiries show that behind the scenes, Satō was more accommodating towards US plans of stationing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. In December 2008, the Japanese government declassified a document showing that during a visit to the US in January 1965, he was discussing with US officials the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the People’s Republic of China.[4] In December 2009, his son reported that his father agreed in a November 1969 conversation with US President Nixon to allow the stationing of nuclear warheads in Okinawa once it was restored to Japanese sovereignty.[5]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eisaku_Satō

Japan Leader Aims to Root Out Bureaucrats http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/asia/25japan.html?_r=0

From “Researching Japanese war crimes records : Introductory essays, Edward Drea, et al, the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, NARA, 2006 http://www.archives.gov/iwg/japanese-war-crimes
Japan War Crimes NARA cover
Very little about Kishi is in the Japan War Crimes document release summary, “Researching Japanese war crimes records” which states: “The IRR collection also contains several files pertaining to postwar activities of suspected Japanese war criminals, such as Kishi Nobusuke, a former official in the Japanese occupation government in Manchuria

The CIA Name Files reveal very little about the agency’s connections to well-known rightists such as suspected war criminal turned Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke in the 1950s and 1960s.106 The extent of the agency’s contacts with individuals who had criminal or quasi-criminal backgrounds remains shrouded, as do the intelligence benefits of this alleged relationship. The documents also do not reveal how the Korean War might have affected the CIA’s attitudes regarding alleged war criminals.
[…]
The rise of concern about Japanese war crimes in the 1990s reinforced the notion that most Japanese war criminals escaped punishment, either because the U.S. government needed their cooperation against the Soviet Union during the early days of the Cold War, or to appease current Japanese economic and commercial interests. Unfortunately, some Japanese war criminals were not punished. Perhaps the most notorious was Gen. Ishii of Unit 731, who escaped postwar prosecution in exchange, apparently, for supplying the U.S. government with details of his gruesome human experiments. Other suspected Japanese war criminals who were never indicted include three postwar prime ministers: Hatoyama Ichirō (1954–1956), Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964), and Kishi Nobusuke (1957). A convicted Class A war criminal, Shigemitsu Mamoru, a senior diplomat and foreign minister during the war years, regained the foreign minister portfolio in 1954. The controversial treatment of Emperor Hirohito by occupation authorities was a subject of debate in Japan and elsewhere since the late 1940s, and especially since the early 1990s in the United States. Although many notorious war criminals went unpunished and lived prosperous and prestigious lives, it is important to recognize that thousands of Japanese war crimes were prosecuted. Twenty-eight Class A war criminals accused of crimes against peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity included many of Japan’s wartime leaders, such as Prime Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the counterpart of Nuremberg, began in May 1946 and ended in November 1948 with the conviction of twenty-five of these defendants. Seven, including Tōjō, were hanged, sixteen were sentenced to life imprisonment (of whom four died in prison), and two received lesser terms. Of the three remaining, two died during the proceedings, and one was declared unfit for trial. The Japanese government paroled all those imprisoned by 1956 and the Foreign Ministry released them unconditionally in April 1958. Allied nations also held war crimes trials throughout Asia and the Pacific. Americans, British, Australians, Dutch, French, Filipinos, and Chinese held trials at forty-nine locations between October 1945 and April 1956. The British prosecuted numerous Japanese for war crimes in Southeast Asia, including those involved in the construction of the Thai-Burma railway of death, immortalized as the Bridge over the River Kwai. Australian prosecutors worked in conjunction with British and American courts to bring Japanese to justice and tried large numbers of Japanese at Amboina, Dutch East Indies, and at Rabaul, New Britain. China tried at least 800 defendants, including some involved in…
[…]
U.S. employment of Japanese war criminals was not limited to G-2 GHQ, nor did the United States exploit only well-connected Japanese ex-military figures. The example of Kaya Okinori, who established contact with the CIA in the late 1950s, is a case in point. Kaya was the Finance Minister, first in Konoye Fumimaro’s 1937 cabinet and again in Tōjō’s wartime cabinet. He accepted the correctness of Japanese hegemony in the Far East, proclaiming shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor that it was Japan’s goal “to force Britain and the U.S. to retreat from East Asia.”93 After the war, the Tribunal found him guilty on count one of the indictment for Class A criminals (conspiracy to wage war) as well as on several counts of waging aggressive war, and it sentenced him to life in prison. He was paroled in September 1955 and pardoned in 1957.94 In 1958, Kaya, esteemed by conservative Japanese, was elected to the Diet and became a well-respected leader of the fractious Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In addition, he was also one of future Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s most trusted advisors. Shortly after he was elected, he joined the LDP’s Internal Security Committee. Kaya, a dedicated anti-communist, appeared perfect for the position. He was deeply concerned and well versed in issues pertaining to Japan’s national security, and after his release from prison, argued forcefully for strengthening the alliance between the U.S. and Japan.95

To this end, in February 1959, Kaya traveled to the United States to discuss Japanese security with representatives from several government agencies, including the State Department and Navy Policy Planning Board. Most notably, Kaya wanted to meet with CIA Director Allen Dulles. His trip took place at a sensitive point in U.S.-Japan relations because it coincided with a groundswell of opinion in Japan to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In the CIA’s eyes, Kaya, who was well versed in international affairs, who publicly favored cooperation with the United States, and who was one of the most influential politicians in the LDP , was potentially a first-rate intelligence source. The CIA was, however, understandably nervous about a convicted Class A war criminal conferring with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). They decided that they had little to fear, noting in part that “Kaya has been behaving admirably since his return to public life.”96 After interviewing him directly in January 1959, CIA agents in Japan noted that Kaya “is highly influential and, being able and vigorous, probably will become more so. His present professed pro-American orientation, whatever its motivation, seems real enough.”97

On February 6, 1959, Kaya, accompanied by Japanese Embassy Secretary Omori Sei’ichi, visited the DCI’s office, where he told Dulles that Japan was especially vulnerable to Communist infiltration and viewed it as his task to ensure that Japan was able to successfully resist Communist influence. Kaya asked Dulles to authorize intelligence sharing between the CIA and the LDP’s Internal Security Committee. Dulles demurred, but noted that the CIA could be helpful in preventing Communist infiltration in Japan. The minutes of the meeting reflect that “everyone agreed that cooperation between CIA and the Japanese regarding countersubversion was most desirable and that the subject was one of major interest to CIA.” Both sides also agreed that the details of their cooperation should be worked out in the field, and that CIA operatives in Japan would be informed accordingly.98 Kaya had scored a major victory in his efforts to deter any communist threat and strengthen U.S.-Japan relations. Dulles personally took the lead in attempting to establish Kaya as a CIA source. Six months later, in August, he sent a letter to Kaya, classified secret, that reaffirmed the CIA’s commitment to the Japanese politician. In it, Dulles stated in part that he was “anxious to do anything” he could to keep U.S.-Japanese relations in good standing. More specifically, he wrote, “I am most interested in learning your views both in international affairs affecting relations between our countries and on the situation within Japan…”99 In November, CIA headquarters followed up Dulles’ letter with a request for information about any progress that had been made with Kaya and whether or not the agents on the ground were interested in working with the politician.100 However, in the period between August and November 1959, CIA personnel in Japan began having second thoughts about Kaya. By early 1960, the agency operatives in Japan concluded that Kaya was not as reliable as they had previously thought. During the summer and fall of 1959, they observed Kaya closely through their established intelligence contacts, discovering that he was not as influential as his reputation indicated and that he might even be a serious liability. They had the uncomfortable task of explaining to their superiors, including the legendary DCI, why they did not want to exploit Kaya:
In the Station’s recent contact with [Kaya], we found that [he] has a distinct tendency to “blow his own trumpet” too loudly and consistently[,] trying to impress the American side with how well he understand[s] the East-West tensions and how he “single-handedly” was able to get the whole LDP in line behind revision of the Security Treaty. [He] is too staid in his ways as a politician of the “old school” we believe, to be willing or even capable of understanding the subtleties of modern-day [parliamentary politics] and political action methods … As of this writing we are not very optimistic that anything further will result from this relationship.

The agents in Japan determined that contact with Kaya would continue only at his initiative and they that would not pursue him as a source.101

After this episode, the CIA only had one casual meeting with Kaya —in Hong Kong in 1961—and had no further interest in him until the middle of 1964. That summer, the agency contacted him through an intermediary in order to discuss what it saw as a growing leftist threat in Japan. At this point, the CIA agent evaluating Kaya claimed that Kaya was “extremely reliable and security conscious. The basic evidence to this nature is to be found in the leading role he has played in his country’s political scheme of things since prior to World War II.”102 CIA Headquarters accepted this evaluation and granted operational authority to exploit him in December 1965.103 Three years later, the CIA reported that Kaya, then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku’s” [Brother to Kishi] “chief LDP advisor, was amenable to covert action directed against the Okinawa elections as well as gathering information on his own party, and that contact with him was being maintained for these purposes.104

Unfortunately, there is no further documentation available as to Kaya’s activities in this regard. In 1975, the CIA cancelled its operational authority to utilize Kaya because his case had become inactive. He died two years later. http://www.archives.gov/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/ There’s only a bit more – about Kishi trying to parole other war criminals. (Emphasis our own throughout.)

Emphasis also added to Wikipedia excerpts.