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Embedded wood in the concrete containment liners caused corrosion-holes in the 1/4 to 1/3rd inch thin steel containment liners of a “few” US Nuclear Reactors!
Naus, 2012, p. 22, Embedded Wood in the containment nuclear power station
Of the 104 currently operating nuclear power plants in the U.S, there are 66 plants that have containment buildings constructed with an inner steel liner plate in contact with a thick concrete shell. The steel liner is nominally 6 to 10 mm [0.25 to 0.375 in] thick and is designed in conjunction with the concrete containment building to function as an essentially leak tight barrier against the release of radiation under accident conditions. Corrosion of the containment liner has been observed and corrosion penetration of the liner associated with foreign materials embedded in the concrete from original construction has occurred in a few U.S. plants.” (Dunn et. al., US NRC).

It took them decades to notice the embedded wood! Thirty three years to notice it at Beaver Valley! Nineteen years at North Anna 2! A work glove found after 24 years. Look at that! Quality concrete! Nuclear Safety! Yep! Good for 40 more years according to the good ol’ US NRC, DOE, utilities, and the rest of the nuclear industry.

Between 1999 and 2009 there have been several reported incidents of external corrosion and through-wall penetration of containment liners in U.S. plants. Most of these cases were associated with defects including wood pieces that were used in original construction to position reinforcement prior to concrete placement and other construction debris that were inadvertently embedded in the concrete. Incidents of through-wall corrosion that initiated at the continent liner/concrete interface were discovered by visual examination of interior surface of the liner. After discovery, repairs typically included removing the foreign materials, filling voids left in the concrete with grout and if necessary, replacing corroded sections of the liner plate.

In May of 1999 at Brunswick Unit 2, three areas were identified where corrosion had penetrated the drywell liner. Two areas were initiated are areas with coating failures. The third location was associated with a work glove that was embedded in the concrete and in contact with the containment liner.

In September of 1999, North Anna Unit 2 discovered a through-wall hole in the containment liner. Removal of the liner plate in the area of the through-wall corrosion revealed a piece of wood that was approximately 10 cm x 10 cm x 1.8 m [4 in x 4 in x 6 ft].

In June 2009 Beaver Valley Unit 1 was conducting an ASME XI IWE general visual examination when an area of blistered paint approximately 75 mm [3 in] in diameter was identified on the interior of the steel liner. After paint removal and cleaning, a rectangular shaped corrosion penetration measuring approximately 2.5 x 1 cm [1 x 3/8 in] was observed. A section of the liner plate was removed and a piece of wood, which was approximately 5 x 10 x 15 cm [2 x 4 x 6 in], was discovered to be embedded in the concrete. (“Containment Liner Corrosion“, Dunn et. al., US NRC, date unknown ) http://pbadupws.nrc. gov/docs/ML1121/ML112140119.pdf
Naus-ORNL-DOE, p. 28 Seabrook ASR
Naus-ORNL-DOE, 2012, p. 28
Naus, 2012, ASR Seabrook zoom
An Oak Ridge-Battelle/DOE employee, Dan Naus, speaks of “surprises”found at various nuclear power stations. Here “surprises” seems to be a euphemism of the sort that one found a “surprise” behind the sofa left by a pet which is not toilet-trained. Those with their heads in the clouds, or in the radioactive and/or tar-ball laden sand, might not have noticed, but concrete has a life-span. Once informed, anyone can look around them and quickly see that it’s a fact. There is no shortage of degraded concrete, even when wood and gloves are not left in the concrete. The radiation in nuclear power stations speeds up this process, as has been discussed in the last two posts. Failure could be catastrophic.

Naus’ own 2012 document, found below, admits that the pre-1995 concrete standards are considered inadequate. This means that no operating US reactor was built under current standards. And, that is if they were done to specification. The US mafia was still very lively at the time when these old nuclear power stations were built. Italians were prevalent in the construction industry. Put two and two together. There is the issue of possible incompetence too. Frighteningly, TVA is supposed to soon open a nuclear power station which was halted decades ago (80% completed in 1988), apparently giving it pre-rotted concrete! Did they check it for hats and gloves? Did they check any of these for dead bodies? That could really mess up the strength of the concrete and it is less far-fetched than wood and a glove.

Considering that the new nuclear power station at Vogtle screwed up the rebar concrete supports for the foundation of the new nuclear power station, it is not hard to imagine that the old concrete is probably not even as good as specified at that time (Amen and Amen), which we reiterate is not acceptable by today’s standards. That’s especially true with that wood and glove! Whether screw-ups were by incompetence or fraud makes no difference for the final effect. If you kill someone by accident or on purpose, dead is dead.

As a logical person would suspect, it appears to have been Oak Ridge’s Dan Naus who tried to sabatage the 2013 William et. al. document, which was discussed yesterday. Still it is shocking to see Oak Ridge stoop to such a low level, especially when preaching to the nuclear IAEA choir. Perhaps it is Naus’ assistant? Is Dan Naus simply an illiterate ignoramus who drops random non-sense into documents, which contradict facts given in the same documents? Or is he doing it on purpose? Regardless, this joker named Dan Naus, and other nuclear jokers, like Moniz, need to be cut off the taxpayer dole and sent to clean up WIPP, Fukushima, Hanford, or some of the other nuclear messes. Let him go look for the Fukushima corium. That will solve two problems – help clean up Fukushima and give this joker the corporeal punishment he deserves for endangering the health and welfare of people and the environment by playing dangerous nuclear games.

On p. 10 of “An Overview of NPP Safety-Related
Concrete Structures and Activities at ORNL
In Support of Continuing their Service
” Naus speaks of “General visual inspection of accessible interior and exterior accessible surfaces of containment“. This is an important problem. Some parts of the nuclear containment pressure vessels cannot be examined. The same appears true for the concrete containment.

On p. 3 Naus points out that “All NPPs contain concrete structures whose performance and function are necessary to protect the safety of plant operating personnel and general public a key role in mitigating the impact of extreme/abnormal operating and environmental events” So, he says it there: at nuclear power stations, concrete structures are needed to protect the general public, especially in the event of nuclear accidents.
Then, like a lunatic, he contradicts himself, and says “Failure often affects serviceability, not safety” Perhaps he meant to say that often failures impact operation without impacting safety, but it’s not what he said. Thus, we blotted this nonsense out. Such contradictory “surprise” crap appeared throughout the document which we examined yesterday and Naus was tacked on as the last author. He also says “As NPPs age, assurances need to be provided that the capacity of the safety-related systems to mitigate extreme events has not deteriorated unacceptably due to either aging or environmental effects“. Who determines the acceptability of deterioration? How is deterioration acceptable at nuclear power stations?
Naus 2012 p. 3 blot
For the record, here it is without blotting out his original, contradictory BS.
Naus 2012 p. 3
Naus, ORNL 2012 p. 4
Page five is entitled “Summary of common causes of defects in concrete members“. WTF? “Concrete members” of what? Members is either parts of a club or body.
Naus 2012 p. 5
Naus 2012 p. 5 ASR cracking
Naus 2012 p. 5, Carbonation
Naus 2012 p. 5 chloride ingress rebar
On p. 6 Naus states that initially ACI Standard 318, “Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete,” was used as the design basis. But, all operating nuclear power stations in the US would have been built under the old standard. He states: “Additional criteria (e.g., loads and load combinations) for design of seismic Category I structures were developed because ACI 318 was not considered adequate and did not cover the entire spectrum of design requirements.”
Naus, 2012, p. 6
p. 9 refers to “10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, “Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors

On p. 10, Naus speaks of “General visual inspection of accessible interior and exterior accessible surfaces of containment and components is required prior to a Type A test to identify evidence of structural deterioration that may affect structural integrity or leak-tightness“. As discussed, one key word here is accessible. Some surfaces are not accessible or visible. This has proved a problem for evaluating the status of a Swiss nuclear reactor pressure vessel.
On p. 11, Naus points out that already in 1995, “Degradation occurrences exhibited a trend to be increasing
Naus, 2012, p. 11
Naus, 2012, p. 15

Notice that he says “Focuses on MANAGING the adverse effects of aging rather than identification of all aging mechanisms” You can’t MANAGE defective parts which can’t be replaced. Defective parts should be changed, and not “managed”. He also can’t make up his mind if period of extended operations is POE or PEO. Huh? “Addresses passive, long-lived components because regulatory process and existing licensee programs may not adequately manage the detrimental effects of aging during the PEOWhat’s an “Acceptable level of safety” according to who? p. 15

On p. 18 he says they have a HISTORY of reliability. History is history! Now they are further degrading! “Operating experience indicates that concrete structures have a history of reliability and durability, but there have been occurrences of degradation
Naus, 2012 p. 18

p. 18
Naus, 2012, p. 18 cracked containment
Concrete Cracking Outside Containment Wall
Naus, 2012, p. 18 Spent fuel pool leakage (b)
Spent fuel pool leakage
Concrete Wall Water Infiltration, Naus, 2012, p. 18
Concrete Wall Water Infiltration
Corrosion of Grease Cap, Naus, p. 18
Naus, 2012, p. 18 Grease Leakage outside containment Wall
Anchor head failure, Naus, 2012, p. 18
Water Intake Structure Rebar Corrosion, Naus, 2012, p. 18
Naus, 2012, p. 20
Naus, 2012, p. 21
Naus, 2012, p. 22
Naus, 2012, p. 22 a zoom
Naus, 2012, p. 22, Embedded Wood in the containment nuclear power station
Notice that he says that investigation “addressed all accessible surfaces. This means that the non-accessible ones were not inspected.
Crystal River 3 p. 23 Naus, 2012
Naus, 2012, p. 24
And, last but not least, Davis Besse, the one which had a hole in the pressure vessel the size of an American football, and where for the containment cracking the NRC’s lawyer took the side of the utility and brushed away citizen concerns in court. Yes, US taxpayer monies at work AGAINST the people.
Davis Bessee in Naus, 2012, p. 27

“An Overview of NPP Safety-Related
Concrete Structures and Activities at ORNL
In Support of Continuing their Service”
Dan Naus Materials Science & Technology Div. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6069
Managed by UT-Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy
First Consultancy on Assessment & Management of Concrete Containment Buildings IAEA Vienna 29 May to 01 June 2012